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Overview
For 20 years some Australian school systems have been world 
leaders in giving schools more autonomy, and in trying to increase 
competition among them. Many countries are following suit, in the 
hope that policies to increase school competition will improve 
student performance. They will not. This is the myth of markets in 
school education. The reality is that competition does not drive 
enough parents to schools with higher levels of performance.   
Governments have increased autonomy with little effect because it 
was not implemented as part of a larger plan to improve teaching 
and learning. Autonomy grants school leaders the authority to 
decide how their schools operate. It differs from competition, where 
schools compete for students. Yet autonomy and competition are 
often linked. Autonomy can allow schools to differentiate 
themselves, and thereby attract students from competitor schools. 
For the first time, this report analyses the extent of school 
competition. On conservative estimates, at least 40 to 60 per cent 
of schools face no or very limited competition of the sort that will 
increase performance. There are many reasons why. Not enough 
schools have competitors that are as high-performing, have room 
for new students, are affordable for enough families, or are 
physically close enough to provide the kind of competition that 
increases performance across systems. What is more, 
governments can do little about it. Interventions to increase the 
capacity of schools or to cut fees through subsidies or vouchers 
are expensive, and will only have a limited impact on school 
competition.  
Increasing information also does little to increase competition. The 
My School website is world-class for giving families data on how 
schools perform. But even with this information, families generally 
don’t move to high-performing schools nor leave low-performing 
ones. In general, good schools don’t grow and bad schools don’t 
shrink.  
On autonomy, Australia and other countries have the wrong 
strategy. The world’s best systems have varying levels of 
autonomy. But it is not central to their reforms. Instead, they 
articulate the best ways to teach and learn, then implement reform 
through high-quality systems of teacher development, appraisal 
and feedback, among other policies. Autonomous schools in 
Australia and other countries are no better at implementing these 
programs than are centralised schools. 
School leaders should be empowered to run their schools well. But 
empowerment means much more than autonomy. Victoria, which 
led the world in increasing autonomy, does not perform above New 
South Wales, which until very recently had a centralised school 
system. School leaders are too often granted autonomy but lack 
the direction, support and development to lead the key reforms 
their schools need.  
Taken together, this report illustrates how the reality of school 
education means that relying on markets is not the best way to 
improve student learning.
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Box 1: Definitions of terms used in this report 
Autonomy: An autonomous school has the authority to make its 
own decisions about how it operates, such as decisions over 
staffing, budget allocation or curriculum content. Increasing school 
autonomy means increasing the extent that school leaders are 
allowed to run their schools how they want.  
Competition: School competition exists when schools compete 
for students (and then normally receive funding and/or school fees 
for each additional student). In theory, school competition 
encourages schools to offer education that is different from or 
better than what neighbouring schools provide.1 Schools compete 
for students in many ways, as families look for many things in 
choosing a school (e.g. school environment and discipline, 
buildings and grounds, school reputation). 
However, competition will only improve school systems when 
schools compete to attract students by raising performance and 
families choose schools based, at least in large part, on school 
performance. This is the focus of this report given the interest in 
improving the performance of school systems. Therefore, school 
competition is discussed in this report as school competition 
based on school performance. 
Parents should be able to choose the school they want. But the 
right of parents to choose schools should not be confused with the 
idea that choice improves school performance. 
  
Performance: In this report, ‘performance’ refers to the learning 
outcomes of students. The analysis of school competition 
presented in this report uses school scores on national student 
assessments (NAPLAN) as the school performance measure. 
This is not the only measure of school performance but it is the 
clearest measure available. 
NAPLAN: The Australian National Assessment Program – 
Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN) has been in operation since 
2008. It assesses Australian students in Years 3, 5, 7, and 9 in 
reading, writing, language conventions (spelling, grammar and 
punctuation), and numeracy. Results for each school are 
published on the My School website. 
Equity: An equitable education system enables all students to 
access good quality education. Many studies of school autonomy 
and competition focus on equity issues.2 School competition could 
lead to greater concentrations of advantage and disadvantage as 
parents can tend to choose schools with more wealthy students. 
While equity is an important issue, it is not analysed in this report. 
Instead, the focus is on the impact of competition and autonomy 
on performance. 
                                            
1 Bartlett (1993), p. 125; Schneider, et al. (2000), p. 9; Henig (1994), p. 57; Hilmer, et al. (1993), p. 2. 
2 See for example Musset, 2012; Fiske and Ladd (2000); Loveless and Field (2009), p. 108-109; Burgess, et al. (2009); Le Grand and Bartlett (1993), p. 133. 
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1. Increasing school competition 
School competition is generally defined as schools competing 
against one another and striving to attract students.3 School 
choice and competition are often used interchangeably, but while 
they are interrelated concepts, they are not the same.4  
Ensuring parents are free to choose schools is the first step in 
increasing school competition.5 The degree to which parents have 
meaningful choices in school education depends on differences in 
the education the schools offer.6 One school might focus on sport 
or a particular pedagogy or culture. That a variety of approaches 
to competition has benefits for families should not be discounted, 
but the key interest is in improving the performance of school 
systems. To improve performance across a system, schools must 
compete on performance.  
School autonomy is important in increasing school competition 
because it gives schools the opportunity to vary the education 
they offer. School competition can improve performance across a 
system if families are free to choose schools with better learning 
and teaching. This doesn't mean schools won't try to improve or 
innovate if such choices don’t exist, merely that improvements 
might be smaller because they won't stem from a market-based 
incentive to gain or retain students. 
                                            
3 Bartlett (1993), p. 125; Schneider, et al. (2000), p.9; Henig (1994), p. 57; 
Hilmer, et al. (1993), p. 2. 
4 For example, see Hess (2002), p 5.; Hastings, et al. (2005); Henig (1994). 
5 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2008), p. 26. 
6 Ibid., p. 26. 
Box 2: International data used in this report 
This report uses data from two international surveys conducted by 
the OECD: the Programme for International School Assessment 
(2009) and the Teaching and Learning International Survey 
(2008). 
The Programme for International School Assessment (PISA) tests 
the knowledge and skills of 15 year-olds in literacy, mathematics 
and science. In the latest assessments (2009), students were 
tested in more than 70 countries.  
PISA tests are designed to capture how well students are 
equipped to apply academic skills in real-world situations. “The 
emphasis is on mastering processes, understanding concepts and 
functioning in various contexts.”7 Students are asked to compose 
long-form answers, as well as answer multiple-choice questions. 
Both parts assess problem-solving skills.  
The Teaching and Learning International Survey (TALIS) is a 
survey of lower-secondary teachers and their school principal. It 
focuses on school leadership, teacher professional development, 
appraisal and feedback, and teaching beliefs and practices. In 
2008, 24 countries participated in the survey.8 
                                            
7 OECD (2010d), p. 20. 
8 The response rate in the Netherlands did not meet the minimum requirement 
and so the country’s results are not reported. 
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1.1 Effects of school competition 
Evidence of the impact of school competition on performance is 
highly inconsistent. Most studies find that increasing school 
competition has a positive, but very small or statistically 
insignificant effect on school performance. A minority of studies 
find much larger effects, both positive and negative. Much of this 
research suffers from methodological difficulties. 
Within-country evidence  
A number of studies highlight the variation in findings and the 
generally positive but often small impact of competition on 
performance. In the United States, a review of 41 competition 
studies found a positive link between competition and school 
quality.9 However, only about one-third of estimates were 
statistically significant and these generally showed small effect 
sizes. Another meta-analysis by Forster (2011) examined the 
performance impact of voucher schemes in the United States. 
The studies analysed were classified by the strength of their 
methodology. Of the ten studies using the ‘gold standard’ of 
methodology, random assignment, nine indicated improvement in 
student outcomes and one indicated no visible effects.10 The 
effects of competition were usually small.11 
                                            
9 Belfield and Levin (2002). 
10 Of those nine positive studies, six showed that all students benefit, while in 
three only some students benefited. An analysis of the wider, less rigorous, 
literature, still found that the majority of studies found a positive effect of voucher 
schemes on student performance (Forster (2011), p. 12 and 24). 
11 Ibid., p. 1. Results are presented without effect sizes.  
In addition to voucher schemes, charter schools in the United 
States have received considerable attention from competition 
researchers.12 A summary of the literature finds that competition 
from charter schools also has a mixed impact on student 
performance. Results vary from small positive effects13 to mixed 
effects14 to negative effects.15 Teasley (2009) cautions about the 
potential to extrapolate from the findings on charter schools, given 
the self-selecting nature of charter school attendance.16 
Hoxby’s work provides some of the most consistent positive 
findings on the impact of school competition.17 For example, 
Hoxby (2003) assesses the impact of school choice and 
competition reforms on both school productivity and achievement 
                                            
12 Charter schools are government-funded, privately operated public schools 
operating in the majority of US states. See summary of research in Teasley 
(2009).  
13 Such as a 0.09 s.d. performance boost of increased attendance at a charter 
school from kindergarten to Year 5. Hoxby and Murarka (2007), cited in ibid., p. 
213. 
14 Hanushek, et al. (2002) find that different types of charter schools have 
different outcomes on students: district authorised charter schools have positive 
effects; state authorised charters have negative effects. Cited in ibid., p. 216. 
See also Sass (2006) and Booker (2004), cited in ibid., p. 216-217.  
15 Bifulco and Ladd (2005) find charter school attendees in North Carolina 
perform worse than their public school counterparts. Cited in ibid., p 217. 
16 When charter schools are oversubscribed they allocate places to students 
based on a lottery. A random assignment study compares students who entered 
the lottery and gained a place at the school to those who entered the lottery and 
did not. Thus, random assignment studies can only be done on oversubscribed 
schools. This may indicate a selection effect independent of the charter school 
effect. Ibid., p. 214. 
17 Hoxby (1994); Hoxby (1999); Hoxby (2000); Hoxby (2003); Hoxby and 
Murarka (2009). 
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growth.18 Hoxby compares achievement growth rates (or test 
results) for elementary schools in Wisconsin that face different 
competitive pressure with the introduction of a voucher scheme 
and the introduction of charter schools in Michigan and Arizona.19 
Schools with the most exposure to competitive reforms improved 
by about seven percentile points in maths compared to about four 
percentile points in schools facing little or no exposure to the 
reforms.20 In reading, schools with the most exposure to 
competitive reforms improved by 0.6 percentile points compared 
to a decline of 1.4 percentile points for schools facing little or no 
exposure to reform.21 However, a number of studies have 
questioned the methodology of Hoxby’s work.22 
                                            
18 Performance measured by national percentile points per thousand dollars of 
per-pupil spending (Hoxby (2003) p. 322). Achievement growth measured by the 
difference in student test results. Students in Wisconsin undertake five tests in 
mathematics, science, social studies, language and reading. (ibid., p. 319). 
19 Growth rates are the difference between 1996-97 and 1999-2000 test results. 
Vouchers were available to students from more disadvantaged backgrounds. 
Schools with a greater proportion of poorer children faced greater potential 
competition – the schools have more children eligible to receive vouchers 
allowing them to change schools. These schools therefore faced a greater 
potential loss of students. Ibid., p. 316. 
20 ‘Most exposure is classified by Hoxby as 'most treated'. These are schools 
where at least two thirds of students are eligible for free or reduced price lunches 
(and thus are eligible for vouchers). (ibid., p. 318). ‘Little or no exposure’ is 
classified as 'untreated comparison schools'. These schools are all of the 
Wisconsin elementary schools that are urban, have at least 25 per cent of 
students eligible for free lunch and at least 15 per cent of their students being 
black (ibid., p. 318.) Seven percentile points is statistically significantly different 
to 'untreated comparison schools' at the 95 per cent level of confidence. 
21 This is statistically significantly different to 'untreated comparison schools' and 
schools that faced some, but not as much competition ('somewhat treated 
schools') at the 85 – 95 per cent level of confidence. Ibid., p. 323. Similarly, 
The mixed evidence base has led to what could be termed the 
next generation of school competition researchers to dismiss the 
notion that school competition will drive performance in school 
systems. Instead, they focus on reforms to increase the 
effectiveness of governance and public accountability 
arrangements for systems with increased choice and 
competition.23  
Negligible and small impacts of competition on performance are 
also evident in a number of countries. Böhlmark and Lindahl 
(2012) find the positive impact of Sweden’s 1992 reforms to 
increase private provision of education to be small (but may 
increase over time).24  Ladd and Fiske (2000) find that reforms to 
increase school competition in New Zealand may have helped 
some schools, but this came at the expense of other schools, 
particularly in poorer communities. The result was a negligible 
effect on system performance.  
                                                                                    
Hoxby assesses the impact of competition introduced by charter schools in 
Michigan and Arizona on productivity and achievement growth. Results suggest 
that Michigan's regular public schools raise their achievement in 4th grade 
reading and maths by a statistically significant amount for the same level of per-
pupil spending following the introduction of charter schools.21 Gains were also 
made for year 7 reading and maths but not at a statistically significant level.21 
Similar achievement growth results were found for Arizona. 
22 Ladd (2003); Rouse and Barrow (2008). 
23 Smarick (2008); Hess (2002). 
24 It is also possible that the effects of competition are not linear. That is, a 
certain density of schools has a positive impact on local schools’ performance, 
but the creation of additional schools beyond that has a different impact on 
performance. It is not clear if such an effect exists, or at what point it has an 
impact. Bukowska and Siwińska-Gorzelak (2011). 
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There is limited and mixed evidence of the impact of school 
competition in Australia. The research has generally been limited 
to the use of school sector as a measure of competition. Rowe 
(1999), controlling for performance in the General Achievement 
Test, finds that between 1994 and 1999, independent and 
Catholic schools students scored approximately 0.22 and 0.10 
standard deviations higher than students attending Government 
schools.25  
Similarly, Marks (2009) and Vella (1999) find that private schools 
have a performance advantage over government schools, even 
when ability and socio-economic status are accounted for. 
Independent and Catholic school students are more likely to 
attend university than government school students, even when 
ability and socio-economic status are taken into account.26  
In contrast, Thomson et al. (2010) analyse the results of PISA 
2009 for the Australian school system. They find that there is no 
statistically significant difference between students’ reading and 
maths performance in government, Catholic and independent 
schools, once the socio-economic background of an individual 
                                            
25 Rowe (1999) cited in Marks (2004).  
26 Marks (2009), p. 35, finds that independent students’ ENTER scores are nine 
per cent higher than government schools and Catholic school students’ are five 
per cent higher. Marks (2010) also finds that independent and Catholic school 
students are almost twice as likely to attend university as students from 
government schools (p. 33). These results control for socio-economic 
background and prior achievement. Vella (1999) uses data from the 1985 
Australian Longitudinal Survey for Youth to compare school completion for those 
who did and did not attend Catholic schools. He finds that attendance at a 
Catholic school increases the probability of completing high school by 17 per 
cent and increases the likelihood that these students obtain post-secondary 
qualifications. 
student and their peers is taken into account.27 This report 
highlights that these studies do not analyse competition – school 
sector is a poor indicator of competition. 
Across-country evidence  
International evidence focuses on the effects of competition on 
performance in PISA tests. Some studies find significant positive 
effects.28 In a prominent example Woessmann et al (2009) used 
PISA 2003 data and found that competition (as measured by the 
percentage of private schools, and the level of public funding for 
private-school students) was associated with significantly higher 
performance. By contrast, Zimmer et al (2011) used PISA 2006 
data and a different measure of school competition (based on 
principals’ perceptions) but found no significant impact on 
performance. The OECD (2010) reached a similar conclusion.29 
1.2 Difficulties in measuring school competition 
The variability in the evidence on the impact of school competition 
on performance partly stems from data difficulties and poor 
competition indicators. The various indicators that are used in 
competition research can be grouped into three categories: 
                                            
27 Thomson et al (2010). Statistically significant differences exist prior to socio-
economic status being taken into account: students in the independent school 
sector achieved significantly higher than those in the Catholic sector who, in turn, 
achieved significantly higher than those in the government sector. See p. 48, 62, 
161 and 201. 
28 Woessmann, L., Luedemann, E., Schuetz, G. and West, M. (2009). 
29 OECD (2010e), p. 45-49. 
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1. System-level frameworks that identify the extent to which 
parents are able to choose schools and then move freely 
between them. Competition is often assessed indirectly by 
measuring school choice.30 But many indicators of school 
choice fail to reflect how much school choice actually exists 
for families. Most OECD countries allow parental choice at all 
levels of schooling and allow private schools to operate.31 
However, this general picture lacks detail of what happens in 
local areas. For example, parents may be allowed to choose 
schools outside their local area but a range of regulatory 
restrictions and practical constraints may prevent them from 
actually getting into the school of their choice. 
2. Presence and accessibility of private schools.32 On 
average across OECD countries, 14 per cent of schools are 
private. In Australia 36 per cent are. 33 More than half of 
schools are private in Belgium and Chile, but in most OECD 
countries fewer than ten per cent of schools are.34 There are 
several problems with comparing these figures. Differences in 
funding, governance and management mean that a private 
                                            
30 It should be noted that governments can create incentives for school leaders 
and teachers by rewarding high performance. Such recognition may create a 
different form of competition in school education.  
31 OECD (2011). 
32 For example, McEwan and Carnoy (2000); Hsieh and Urquiola (2006); 
Böhlmark and Lindahl (2012). 
33 OECD (2013), Table C1.4 (lower secondary schools are used as these most 
closely match the analysis in Chapter 2).  
34 ibid.  
school in one country can look very different to private schools 
in other countries.35 
3. Survey data on the perceptions of choice and competition 
that focus on how families choose a school or the amount of 
competitive pressure school leaders feel. Perception does not 
always equal reality. Care must be taken in drawing definitive 
conclusions regarding the actual amount of choice and 
competition from surveys of students and educators in 
schools. 
In short, school competition is difficult to measure directly. Many 
indicators have been used, but all have substantial failings. There 
is a gap in the evidence on how much school competition actually 
exists.  
                                            
35 Woessmann, et al. (2009); OECD (2010c). 
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Box 3: indicators of school competition: Australia’s high 
rankings 
Various indicators of school competition have been used to 
measure the impact on performance. According to these 
indicators, Australia has a high level of school competition. Figure 
1 shows that 36 per cent of Australia’s schools are private, 
compared to an OECD average of 14 per cent. These schools are 
also made more accessible by government funding. In 2012, 
Australian governments funded private students at 78 per cent of 
the rate of public school students (considerably higher than the 
OECD average, where private students get public funding at a 
rate equal to 57 per cent of government school students). 
Another indicator of school competition is the percentage of 
students who report that they chose a school for reasons other 
than it simply being the local school (Figure 2). Here, again, 
Australia (34 per cent) is well above the OECD average of 25 per 
cent.  
Last, Figure 3 shows that more Australian school principals 
believe they face competitive pressures from other schools than 
school principals in any other OECD country.  
However, as discussed above, these indicators have numerous 
measurement problems. A different approach to measuring school 
competition is presented in Section 2. 
 
 
Sources: OECD (2012b); (2013), Table C1.4 (Lower secondary was calculated as it most 
closely matches the analysis in Chapter 2); OECD (2003); OECD (2010b). 
 Figure 1: Countries with the highest proportion of private schools (top 6 of 
65, 2013) 
 
Figure 2: Countries with the highest proportion of students selecting a 
school for reasons other than it being the ‘local’ school (top 8 of 40, 2003) 
 
Figure 3: Countries with the highest proportion of school principals 
reporting that they face competition from two or more schools (top 5 of 65, 
2009) 
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2. Is school education an effective 
market? 
School education research includes many analyses of the impact 
of various indicators of school competition, but the policy 
implications are unclear.  
Advocates of increasing school competition emphasise the need 
for private schools to be able to enter the market, for parents to be 
free to choose between schools, and for schools to feel 
competitive pressures. Basic indicators show that Australia has all 
of these in abundance so the amount of school competition 
should be high. To date no analysis has comprehensively 
measured the amount of school competition that actually exists. 
This report aims to address that problem.36 
2.1 The school education market 
This report is interested in the kind of school competition that will 
lift performance across a system. Schools may compete in many 
areas, including buildings, class sizes, extracurricular activities 
and so on. To increase academic performance across a system, 
there must be substantial competition on student academic 
outcomes. This creates the incentive for school leaders to 
improve academic performance in their schools.  
This report focuses on competition where families can move to 
higher performing schools or ones that are at least as high-
                                            
36 We focused on schools in South East Queensland as this was the only region 
where there was sufficient publicly available data to complete the analysis.  
performing. To measure school competition the number of 
schools that face competition from other schools was measured. 
This was done by measuring for each school: 
1. How many schools are in its local market? 
2. How many of them are performing at a level as high as or 
higher than the school being measured? 
3. How many of them are already at their enrolment capacity? 
4. How many of them charge school fees, and what percentage 
of families in each school market can afford those fees? 
By answering these questions it is possible to measure which 
schools face competition from other schools.  
Box 4: Departing from previous research on school 
competition 
Previous research has tried to measure the impact of competition 
on school performance. But competition is difficult, if not 
impossible to measure in a simple indicator. Quantitative studies 
and regression analyses that use these simple indicators are 
therefore limited. This analysis departs from the typical use of 
poor indicators of school competition, by conducting an analysis 
of local school markets, school performance, affordability, 
capacity, and enrolment patterns. These real-world factors are 
often ignored. It is only through this approach that it is possible to 
observe the current amount of school competition and its potential 
to drive performance in school systems.  
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According to the data, a conservative estimate of the amount of 
competition in school education markets is that between 43 and 
61 per cent of schools face no or very little competitive pressure 
from other schools. Under plausible but less conservative 
assumptions, the percentage of schools facing limited or no 
competition may be as high as 81 per cent.  
The analysis does not include other factors that affect school 
choice, such as the religious orientation of a school. Lack of data 
prevents this analysis. However, it is clear that if these elements 
were incorporated into the analysis then the percentage of 
schools facing no or very limited competition would substantially 
increase.37  This explains why school competition is not a policy 
lever to significantly improve learning and teaching.38 
2.2 How was this conclusion reached? 
Several analyses to measure competition in school education 
markets were undertaken. These are discussed in detail in 
Appendix A and are briefly detailed below. 
1. How are local school education markets defined? 
                                            
37 Another important factor for many families that we cannot include in our 
analysis is if siblings attended a particular school. This normally eases the 
entrance requirements to a school. This can have two opposing effects: for 
younger siblings it can broaden their school choice if they can enter a school 
because of their older sibling that they would normally not be able to attend. But 
this may reduce accessibility for other students who would like to attend the 
school. 
38 These results relate to SEQ, but indicators suggest this area is representative 
of other metropolitan areas in Australia (see Appendix A). 
Competition exists only when families can and will choose other 
schools. If a better school is too far away then not enough families 
will move to create competition.39  
Data limitations meant the focus was on secondary schools in 
South East Queensland (SEQ).40 It is a significant metropolitan 
area, containing the three large urban areas of Brisbane 
(population: 2.1 million), Gold Coast (591,000) and Sunshine 
Coast (285,000).41 SEQ is representative of school competition in 
growing metropolitan areas across Australia and many other 
countries (see Appendix A for a more detailed discussion of the 
SEQ secondary school market). Schools in this area are broadly 
representative of the average Australian metropolitan school, 
                                            
39 The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission’s guidelines for 
analysing the competitiveness of markets asserts that “in cases where only a 
small proportion of sales is likely to switch (following a change in price, service or 
quality), the alternative product or geographic region is not part of the relevant 
market.” (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2008), p. 17)That 
is, if not many families will switch to another school, then the market is not 
functioning as a single competitive market. Further geographic implications for 
market competitiveness include the costs and related constraints of moving, 
establishing, or expanding schools to different geographic locations; the costs to 
students and families of moving to a school in another geographic location; 
limitations on families in accessing schools in other geographic locations (i.e. 
school boundaries operate as a severe limitation on the competitiveness of the 
school education market); regulatory and practical constraints in operating 
schools in different locations; and relative price levels in different locations.  
40 We assume that differences in travel patterns, size of schools, and willingness 
to pay school fees would be different for primary school education. We therefore 
caution against extrapolation of our findings for secondary schools to other levels 
of education.  
41 Australian Bureau of Statistics (2013), Population Estimates by Significant 
Urban Area, Table 1. 
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although they do tend to be slightly bigger than the Australian 
average.42  
Figure 4: Geographic area of the analysis 
 
Source: Queensland Department of Transport and Main Roads (2009); ABS Census2011 
 
Markets for school education are more local than those for other 
industries and sectors.43 Figure 5 depicts school commuting 
patterns in SEQ and shows that nearly 80 per cent of people 
                                            
42 See Table 4 in Appendix A for a comparison of SEQ and the rest of Australia. 
43 See Woods, et al.(1998) and Bell (2009). 
travel less than ten kilometres to their school. 44 The conservative 
assumption was made that a school's local market is defined by 
the distance that 95 per cent of families travel for education – that 
is, by a boundary that extends 21.7 kilometres around each 
school in the case of SEQ. We believe the boundary would be 
smaller in bigger cities with greater population density, but 
conservative assumptions are preferred for the analysis of this 
region. We then identified which schools were in each school 
education market.  
Figure 5: Likelihood that current school commuters travel at least a 
particular distance 
 
Note: This function is essentially (1 minus the CDF of Figure 13)Source:
 Queensland Department of Transport and Main Roads (2009) 
                                            
44 Most studies find that students attend their local school (See Chumacero, et 
al. (2011) and Noailly, et al. (2012)). An English study of school choice found 
that the median distance primary school children travelled to school was 743m. 
(Gibbons, et al. (2008) . 
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2. How do we define how schools are performing? 
Given the focus on secondary schools, school performance is 
defined as the average score on NAPLAN national assessments 
for Year 9 students (across all domains, for 2008-2011).45 A 
school is defined as ‘at least as high-performing’ as another 
school if its average Year 9 score was greater than or equal to the 
other school over that period. 
It is hard to know how parents evaluate schools using 
performance data. Some people may be interested in raw scores, 
while others may value performance that is high compared to 
similar schools. Based largely on evidence from the UK, we 
assume that parents and students focus more on absolute 
achievement, as opposed to similar school scores.46  
Clearly, people will choose schools based on factors other than 
performance (see Section 3). We do not disregard these factors. 
But if school competition is to increase learning and teaching 
across a system, then competition must be based on school 
performance.  
                                            
45 That is, for schools that had reported Year 9 NAPLAN scores in each round of 
testing, the measure of performance was taken to be the average of the 20 
scores (4 years, 5 domains). This data was sourced from the My School website 
(Australian Curriculum Assessment and Reporting Authority (2013a)). 
46 See Coldron, et al. (2008). Using raw achievement as opposed to a measure 
of value-added appears to be the rational choice for parents interested in 
maximising their child’s test scores, as illustrated in Allen and Burgess (2011). 
See also MacLeod and Urquiola (2009). 
3. How do we know if schools are already at capacity? 
The capacity of each school to accept more students was made 
available by the Queensland Department of Education.47 For 
private schools, we emailed surveys and conducted phone 
interviews.48  
Many parents will be familiar with schools being full or having 
strict zoning requirements (that mean children can only attend a 
school if they live in a specified local area). In many cases, the 
zoning requirements are a response to being full (or nearly full).  
4. How did we measure households’ willingness to pay school 
fees? 
Data on school fees was obtained from individual school websites 
and the My School website. We then developed a measure of 
willingness to pay school fees for each household. For every 
observed level of private school fees, we calculated the proportion 
of people who currently pay at least that figure in fees (for a range 
of income brackets).49  
We assumed that if ten per cent of its students can potentially 
enrol in a competitor school then a school is considered to face 
                                            
47 To download the data, see Department of Education Training and Employment 
(Qld) (2012). 
48 54 (out of 128) private schools did not respond to the survey. We imputed ‘at 
capacity’ status for respondents, based on a simple probit model that is 
discussed in Appendix A. 
49 Wave 10 of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) 
was used to estimate the relationship between household income and the level 
of spending on education. 
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competition from other schools. We are unsure how many of the 
potential ten per cent would actually choose another school. It 
may be zero or only two to three per cent, in which case the 
school may face little competition. We have chosen to be very 
conservative in the assumptions, since we cannot accurately 
measure these market failures.  
2.3 An example of a school education market 
To illustrate the analytical method used to reach these findings, 
we present an example of the analysis using a randomly chosen 
school (School X) in SEQ. We found that School X has local 
competitors that are at least as good, and not at capacity, and that 
its nearest competitor is sufficiently close and affordable for a 
‘significant’ proportion of its catchment to consider this option.  
There are 25 schools in this school education market and, through 
the following analytical steps, it was found that School X faces 
competitive pressures:  
1. The local market for this school was defined by the 95th 
percentile of commuting distances (21.7 kilometres).50 See 
Table 10 for a listing of School X’s competitors’ information. 
2. We calculated the likelihood that people would be willing to 
travel from this school to each of the 25 schools in the local 
market. We assume that, for example, a school located 19 
                                            
50 See Appendix A for the whole distribution. 
kilometres away is less likely to present a competitive threat 
than a school three kilometres away.51 
3. Fourteen of the 25 schools were at least as high-performing 
according to national assessments. 
4. Of the 14 schools that were at least as high-performing, only 
four had capacity to accept new students. 
5. We built household income profiles to analyse the likelihood 
that a family that can at least afford to attend School X can 
afford each competitor school. For example, we estimate that 
a typical household in this school education market would 
have a 19 per cent likelihood of being willing to pay the 
$18,232 p.a. to attend the most expensive school in the 
market.52 
6. Final analysis for this school 
Table 1 shows the number of competitors that the school faces. 
Four schools in School X’s local area are at least as high-
performing and have spare capacity. 
                                            
51 School commuting data shows that only seven per cent of families are willing 
to commute 19km to attend the school of their choice (Queensland Department 
of Transport and Main Roads (2009). 
52 More detailed discussion of the statistical analysis of these assumptions and 
their impact on the analysis is presented in Appendix A. 
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Table 1: Number of competitors facing School X 
Schools Number 
All competitors  25 
Competitors that are at least as high-performing 14 
Competitors that also have spare capacity 4 
 
• The probability that households would commute the distance 
from School X to the closest of the four schools was 26 per 
cent. 
• The probability that households in the market would be able to 
pay the fees of the closest of the four schools was 49 per cent. 
The product of these two numbers is 12 per cent, which means 
that the most likely competitor school is only a viable option for 12 
per cent of families in School X’s core local market. This exceeds 
the nominal threshold (ten per cent) of whether or not a school 
stands to lose a significant proportion of its enrolment. 
Consequently, School X was deemed to be facing competition.  
These analytical steps were then undertaken for every secondary 
school in SEQ (see Appendix A). 
2.4 Different policy settings 
To make the analysis more relevant to policy makers we analysed 
what would happen under various policy reforms to increase 
school competition and different assumptions about school 
education markets. We tested what happens to school 
competition if:  
1. Schools are only competitors if they are higher 
performing schools.  
This report uses the conservative assumption that a school is 
a competitor when it is at least as high-performing as another 
school. If systems want to improve, families need to have the 
choice to move to higher performing schools.  
If the focus is on competitor schools that perform at a level 
‘above’ the school under analysis, then the percentage of 
schools facing no competition increases to 63 per cent.53 This 
increases to 81 per cent if the focus is on schools that perform 
‘substantially above’.54 
2. Families will not travel 21.7 kilometres to another school.  
This report makes the conservative assumption that each 
school’s local market extends to 21.7 kilometres from the 
school (the 95th percentile of observed school commuting 
distances).  
This may overestimate the size of each school’s local market. 
More than half of people travel only 5.6 kilometres to get to 
                                            
53 Our definition of ‘above’ is aligned with the My School website’s definition. A 
school receives an ‘above’ (pale green) rating if it is greater than 0.2 standard 
deviations above a comparator school or benchmark (ACARA). This is used in 
combination with the distribution of results in NAPLAN’s 2011 Year 9 testing 
(NAPLAN (2011), by way of example, see p. 194 for reading) . 
54 Once again our definition is aligned to the My School website. See above 
footnote for sources. 
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school. If it is assumed that local school education markets 
extend only that distance then 74 per cent of schools are 
assessed as not having a viable competitor. In other words, if 
people will only travel about five or six km to school, then 
almost three quarters of schools have no competitor.55  
3. Fewer families actually move to better schools.  
In this analysis, the conservative assumption is that schools 
face competitive pressure if ten per cent of households in a 
school’s local market could choose the nearest competitor 
school. But Chapter 3 shows that families do not often move 
based on (NAPLAN) performance.  
The ten per cent figure does not represent the proportion of 
current or potential students who actually would choose a 
competitor school. The percentage of people in the market 
who actually choose a different school is likely to be much 
lower. We therefore believe that the ten per cent figure is a 
very conservative threshold. 
The effect of changing this ten per cent threshold is illustrated 
in Table 14 in Appendix A. 
                                            
55 Conversely, if we made the assumption that a school’s local market extended 
35km in every direction from the school, then only 42 per cent of schools face 
little or no competitive pressure. The dual impact of the ‘local area’ and ‘clearly 
better’ assumptions are discussed in Appendix A.  
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3. Can governments improve the effectiveness of the market?
A lack of competitive pressure in markets often leads to 
government interventions to address market failures and improve 
the functioning of the market.56 But in school education 
governments have few viable options to increase competition to 
improve performance.  
3.1 Addressing demand-side constraints in the school 
education market 
In Australia, government regulations do not overly restrict school 
choice. In some countries – including high performers Finland, 
Japan and Korea – regulatory barriers limit choice. 57 Australian 
parents have the right to choose a school in the government, 
Catholic or independent school sectors. But once families have 
the right to choose a school, many factors influence that choice.   
Schools are an experience good; the quality of a school can only 
be fully ascertained after the initial decision to attend. This 
increases uncertainty in school choice.58 Data, including from the 
OECD, shows that parents most value the school environment 
(which includes school discipline) and reputation above academic 
achievements.59 Subject offerings are also important, as are 
geography, cost, religious philosophy and family connections. In 
                                            
56 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2008). 
57 OECD (2011), Table D5.5. 
58 Horner (2002), p. 644. 
59 West (1992); Weston (1998); OECD (2010a), p. 57; Independent Schools 
Queensland (2011), p. 10; Ball, et al. (2006); Campbell, et al. (2009); Bosetti 
(2004). 
one Australian survey, 82.4 per cent of parents said that they 
were influenced by school facilities and grounds.60  
Families’ choices should be respected. However, this does not 
imply that school performance will increase as a result. With so 
many factors driving school choice, schools have the incentive to 
invest in the numerous areas that attract families. It is therefore 
hard to determine the extent that school choice and competition 
can drive performance.  
A further complication is that changing schools can be costly. It 
can also affect the educational performance of students.61 
Classes work at different paces and often cover different topics, 
so children moving from one school to another might struggle to 
catch-up with their new peers, or find they are repeating material 
they have already learnt.62 Known as transaction costs, these 
downsides to switching schools reduce the effectiveness of the 
school education market by reducing the ease with which parents 
can choose to change their child’s school.  
                                            
60 Independent Schools Queensland (2011), p.7. 
61 Changing schools is associated with a decline in achievement, with low 
income and minority students tending to struggle more. See Sorin and Iloste 
(2006), p. 229, p. 235; Ingersoll, et al. (1989); South, et al. (2007); Strand and 
Demie (2007), p. 323; Grigg (2012), p. 389. 
62 Lash and Kirkpatrick (1990), p. 178, p. 186; Sorin and Iloste (2006), p. 235. 
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3.2 Increasing information to increase school competition  
To address these constraints, many governments around the 
world have made school performance information public, to 
improve information and reduce costs in finding better schools.  
The My School website allows families to compare the 
performance of all Australian schools and to make direct 
comparisons between similar schools (as measured by socio-
economic status) and local schools.  
Yet for this intervention to improve school competition, and for 
competition to improve performance across the system, more 
students would need to choose higher performing schools and 
leave (or choose not to attend) lower performing schools. While 
My School has substantially increased transparency and the focus 
on key learning areas, the results show that by and large this shift 
in enrolment has not occurred.63  
Figure 6 shows that there is at most a very weak relationship 
between NAPLAN scores and enrolment. An increase in NAPLAN 
scores of 36.6 points (which is ‘substantial’ difference according to 
the My School website) translates to a higher enrolment growth 
rate of only 0.7 per cent each year.64 
                                            
63 This analysis was completed before the release of full NAPLAN results for 
2012. Therefore, they could not be included in the analysis.  
64 This represents the smallest gap required for the My School website to 
indicate that one school is performing ‘substantially above’ a benchmark. A 
school receives a ‘substantially above’ (dark green) rating if it is greater than 0.5 
standard deviations above a comparator school or benchmark (ACARA). This is 
Figure 6: Enrolment change and performance on national 
assessments (Australian schools 2009-2011) 
 
Note:  average across all domains, y-axis constrained at absolute change of 60 per 
cent, meaning there are 25 data points not shown on this chart. 
  
                                                                                    
used in combination with the distribution of results in NAPLAN’s 2011 Year 9 
testing (NAPLAN (2011) e.g. see p. 194 for reading scores). 
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Box 6: What is My School? 
The My School website was a significant increase in transparency 
in Australian school education. It provides a school profile, finance 
information, course offerings, a list of schools in the local area, 
and performance on standardised assessments compared to all 
schools and statistically similar schools. The OECD considers it a 
high-quality innovation in transparency and in making information 
available to families.65  
The same finding holds if similar schools are compared. Many 
systems around the world have struggled with how to fairly 
compare schools with different student populations. Some focus 
on value-added models that control for students’ socio-economic 
background and some use a variety of statistical techniques to 
account for differences.66 Others, including Australia, try to 
compare similar types of schools.67 Parents can compare their 
school’s performance to schools with similar student bodies 
(based on socio-economic status). But this new information does 
not increase competition in a way that improves performance.  
Figure 7 shows again that there is only a very weak positive 
relationship between enrolment change and performance (even 
when controlling for a school’s socio-economic status). There are 
high-performing schools that are shrinking and there are low- 
performing schools that are growing rapidly.  
                                            
65 OECD (2012a). 
66 OECD (2008). 
67 Ibid., p. 14-15. 
Figure 7: Enrolment change and performance on national 
assessments compared to similar schools (Australian schools) 
 
Note:  average across all domains; x-axis constrained at absolute value of 100, and y-
axis constrained at enrolment changes of 60 per cent which means 34 data 
points are not shown on this chart. 
Local schools 
School education markets are local. Competition should be at its 
greatest in local markets where families can most easily move to 
higher performing schools. Figure 8 explores this by plotting 
enrolment change against a measure of relative local 
performance (i.e. a school’s score compared to the average of its 
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local competitor schools). The relationship is slightly stronger than 
that presented in Figure 6 and Figure 7 but it remains weak.68 
Schools performing significantly above the local average (i.e. with 
a score at least 14.6 points higher than the local average) grow 
less than one per cent faster than other local schools. 
The absence of movement between local competitors adds further 
weight to the competition estimates presented in Chapter 2. It 
shows why policies designed to increase school competition will 
have little impact on school performance.  
3.3 Addressing constraints in the supply of education  
Governments may make supply interventions to increase school 
competition. Interventions to reduce capacity constraints and 
private school fees are analysed below. These interventions, too, 
will yield little increase in school competition. 
3.3.1 Substantially reducing capacity constraints 
Physical barriers prevent schools expanding; classrooms and 
buildings will only hold so many people. Regulations and class 
size constraints could be loosened to allow high-performing 
schools to accept more students.  
 
                                            
68 Data constraints in other states mean only schools in Queensland were 
analysed. ‘Local’ is defined as a 21.7km radius around each school (the 95th 
percentile of distances travelled to school – further explanation in Appendix A).  
Figure 8: Enrolment change and performance on national 
assessments compared to local schools  
(Queensland schools only) 
 
Note:  average across all domains. ‘Local’ is defined by a 21km radius around each 
school. Schools with no ‘local’ comparator are not shown on this chart. 
 
To return to the school education market in SEQ, removing 
capacity constraints in every government school would be a large, 
costly reform. Even then, the reform would not substantially 
change the competition landscape, reducing the percentage of 
schools that face no or limited competition from 43 to 30 per 
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cent.69 While the prevalence of capacity constraints in 
government schools is a problem, addressing the problem will be 
expensive and is unlikely to produce competition across the 
system.  
There are a variety of reasons why this major change doesn’t 
have more of an impact. First and foremost, school markets are 
local. Although people’s preferences for school commuting may 
change if very high quality but distant public schools opened their 
doors, it would still likely be the case that many people would not 
be able or inclined to access them. Second, a majority of the high-
performing schools that might offer competition are private (and 
so remain unaffected by the change). Last, high performing 
government schools are often in areas where there is already 
more competition (which means that increasing capacity will, at 
the margin, result in a less impressive increase in the number of 
schools facing competition). This illustrates the fact that, while 
capacity constraints in government schools are problematic, 
addressing this issue will not fuel system-wide competition. 
3.3.2 Substantially reducing private school fees 
Reducing private school fees to allow more students to attend 
these schools might also increase competition. Yet once again, 
even a dramatic shift would do surprisingly little to increase the 
number of schools facing competition. Halving private school fees 
in the form of a direct subsidy or voucher would be extremely 
                                            
69 This assumes that each school’s local market is 21.7km around each school, 
and with schools assumed to be competitors if they perform at least as highly 
performing as other schools. See Appendix A for more detail on the change in 
competition under different assumptions.  
costly. Yet this reform would only reduce the percentage of 
schools that face no or limited competition from 43 to 33 per 
cent.70 It is not the cost of private schools that is responsible for 
low levels of school competition.  
3.4 Why can’t government do more to increase 
competition? 
A number of additional market failures in school education 
illustrate why competition is so scarce. Four of the most important 
are: the absence of market prices; the failure to close low-
performing schools; externalities; and, principal-agent problems. 
3.4.1 Market price and learning and teaching in schools 
For any market to operate effectively, price needs to balance 
supply and demand. When price becomes distorted it no longer 
reflects quality and market efficiency is often dramatically 
reduced.71 
Price is often completely absent from the school education market 
meaning a competitive market equilibrium is not reached. 
Government schools cannot use price to clear demand because 
they cannot raise fees to market-clearing prices because school 
                                            
70 This assumes that each school’s local market extends 21.7km around each 
school, and with schools assumed to be competitors if they perform at least as 
highly performing as other schools. See Appendix A for more detail on the 
change in competition under different assumptions. 
71 Hilmer, et al. (1993), p. 4. 
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education is widely considered a social good.72 Free education 
has long been common in most countries. Parents expect it.  
What about private schools? Most are not-for-profit organisations 
and have the explicit aim of keeping fees low. This aim is at odds 
with a competitive market. Private schools usually maintain long 
waiting lists rather than increasing fees to clear waiting lists and 
set a ‘market price’.  
When price is not an indicator of quality, price does not inform 
consumers or provide sufficient incentive to schools to improve 
the quality of learning and teaching to attract more families.  
3.4.2 Poorly performing schools don’t close 
Not only do poorly performing schools not close and exit the 
market, they often sustain and even grow their enrolments. This 
makes it hard for potential new schools to enter the market, and 
probably reduces the number of new entrants given large start-up 
costs.  
Closing a school can also be politically costly. People often view 
their local school, no matter how poorly it is performing, as the 
heart of their community. In 2011, the Tasmanian Government 
announced it had a list of 20 schools it believed were no longer 
viable and would need to demonstrate their capacity in order to 
continue operation. The Government, facing a budget shortfall, 
estimated the closure of these schools could save $24 million a 
year.73 But the political backlash was severe. Eventually, the 
                                            
72 Hess (2002). 
73 ABC News (2011). 
Government announced that no Tasmanian schools would close 
before the next election.74 
It is also not easy to close a private school. Governments quickly 
become accountable if one gets into difficulty. A media backlash 
followed the sudden closure of three private schools in Victoria 
last year. For example, Mowbray College, in the Melbourne 
suburb of Melton, closed in June 2012 after accumulating up to 
$18 million in debt. The announcement of the imminent collapse 
prompted emotive media stories; a video circulated online of two 
young boys begging the government to keep their school open.75 
Governments shoulder costs even when private schools close. 
3.4.3 Externalities 
There are strong peer effects in education; the performance of 
students influences their peers.76 This means that when a family 
chooses a school they are influenced by the type of students in 
the school rather than strictly by school performance (that may or 
may not reflect the peer group). This means that decisions in the 
school education market can become further removed from issues 
of school performance. 
                                            
74 The Tasmanian Government also established a ‘School Transition Fund’ to 
“encourage innovation within school communities by supporting those schools 
that wish to voluntarily close, co-locate, federate or amalgamate.” The 
government has committed $3.5m over 2 years. More than a dozen Tasmanian 
schools are now in talks to close or merge, most not on the original list of 
scheduled closures. (Department of Education (Tas) (2012)). 
75 Humpage and Mawby (2012). 
76 Borjas (1998). 
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In other markets, prices can be regulated to better address such 
externalities.77 Yet market prices rarely exist in school education. 
School funding models can recognise the impact of peer effects 
by increasing equity funding for schools serving poorer 
communities. This may increase competition in some instances, 
but it is more likely to make schools more equitable than to 
increase competition.  
3.4.4 Principal-agent problems  
Some schools, particularly those struggling for enrolments, clearly 
have incentives (sometimes financial) to attract more students. 
But learning occurs in the classroom, and teachers have very 
limited financial incentives to attract more students to their school. 
Rewards for teachers, such as promotion, extra pay, bonuses and 
recognition, are not related to school competition. A teacher will 
improve, or not, regardless of whether they work in a competitive 
environment.  
Some suggest that competitive incentives are strong for teachers, 
because their fates can be tied to that of the school.78 However, 
as this report shows, school enrolments are not closely tied to 
school performance, substantially reducing incentives for most 
schools to invest in raising teacher performance.  
                                            
77Lazear (2001). 
78 Hoxby (1994), p. 6. 
The myth of markets in school education 
Grattan Institute 2013  23 
4. Increasing school autonomy 
School autonomy is not a new concept in Australia. The argument 
in favour of it goes back at least as far as the 1973 Karmel 
Report:79 
Responsibility will be most effectively discharged where the 
people entrusted with making decisions are also the people 
responsible for carrying them out, with an obligation to justify 
them, and in a position to profit from their experience. 
4.1 Why school autonomy can be beneficial 
A number of arguments have been made in favour of autonomy:  
1. Schools have local knowledge: School leaders know more 
about their school than a centralised authority does. They can 
therefore make more informed decisions.80 For example, a 
school principal is better placed to know which teaching 
applicant will be a good fit for the school.  
2. Each school must respond to its specific circumstances: 
Central policies designed for all schools may not be the best fit 
for individual schools.81 Avoiding bureaucratic processes may 
allow schools to be more responsive to solving their specific 
                                            
79 Karmel (1973) p.10. 
80 See, for example, Woessmann, et al. (2009); Hoxby (1999); Caldwell and 
Spinks (2008); Nous (2011), p. 151. 
81 Chubb and Moe (1990), p. 14; Angus and Olney (2011), p. 11-12. 
problems.82 In addition, school autonomy can help empower 
school leaders to develop the policies that best improve 
learning and teaching in their specific school.83  
3. Autonomy allows schools to experiment and find what 
works: Innovation can increase as school leaders use their 
greater freedom to come up with new solutions and 
programs.84 Innovation means that more schools operate 
differently, providing families with more school choice.85  
4. Using local information can lead to more efficient 
outcomes: Budgets developed at a central government level 
can increase costs when all schools are forced to spend 
money the same way. School autonomy over budgets can 
lead to more specific expenditures that better suit each school, 
with fewer resources spent on non-essential items.86 
5. Schools will become more accountable for outcomes: 
Autonomous leaders often feel more responsibility for school 
performance. For example, a school autonomy pilot program 
                                            
82 Hugh Watson Consulting (2004); Caldwell and Spinks (2013); Australian 
Teacher Magazine (2012b); Australian Teacher Magazine (2012a); Department 
for Education (England) (2013). 
83 Caldwell and Spinks (2008). 
84 Hargreaves (2010); Hargreaves (2012); Greene, et al. (2010), p. 6; Witte 
(1990), p. 39; Nous (2011) p.151. 
85 Witte (1990), p. 38. 
86 Woessmann, et al. (2009), p. 36; Odden and Busch (1998); Clark (2009). 
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in NSW found that many principals understood the 
accountability that came with greater autonomy.87  
6. Autonomy should foster a sense of ownership in school 
management: Greater school autonomy and accountability 
can engender a strong sense of ownership among staff. 
Ownership can increase innovation and effective reforms in 
schools.88  
4.2 School autonomy is complex  
School autonomy is more complex than is often portrayed. It is not 
the case that a school simply has autonomy or does not. Schools 
have different levels of autonomy over different aspects of 
decision-making. This complexity is one reason research findings 
vary on the impact of school autonomy on student performance.89  
The OECD identifies four areas of school autonomy: staffing; 
budgeting; student policies; and, curriculum and assessment 
autonomy. Schools in different countries are given very different 
amounts of autonomy across each aspect of decision-making.90 
Australian principals often cite autonomy over staffing – including 
the power to hire and fire, and set salaries – as the most 
important domain of decision-making in which they need 
autonomy.91 Yet across the OECD, it is this area where there is 
                                            
87 Department of Education and Communities (NSW) (2011) p.26. 
88 Triant (2001) p.4; Hargreaves and Hopkins (1991), p. 7; White (1992), p. 76. 
89 See, for example, Hanushek, et al. (2011) and Woessmann, et al. (2009). 
90 OECD (2010f). 
91 McKenzie, et al. (2011), p.106; Department of Education and Communities 
(NSW) (2011), p. 21. 
often the least amount of autonomy.92 This leaves significant 
scope for reforms that devolve staffing decisions to schools.  
Large differences exist among schools sectors within Australia. 
Generally, government schools have less autonomy than Catholic 
schools, which have less autonomy than independent schools. 
Among states, Victoria has gone furthest down the path of 
autonomy.93 Other states are following Victoria’s lead and 
narrowing the gap between government and private schools. 
Recent reforms in WA, NSW, SA, and the ACT have all increased 
school autonomy.94  
4.2.1 School autonomy and performance 
There is no doubt that some schools will excel with increased 
autonomy.95 They will innovate and reform schooling in numerous 
ways.96 School autonomy can also lead to reforms that improve 
practices in classrooms.97 Much of this research does not claim 
that a causal direct link exists between school autonomy and 
student performance. Instead, it emphasises the advantages of 
school autonomy as part of a comprehensive strategy for school 
and system improvement.98 
                                            
92 OECD (2010b). 
93 Keating, et al. (2011) p.31. 
94 See ibid. p. 31; Department of Education (WA) (2012a); NSW Public Schools 
(2012); Productivity Commission (2012) p. 242; Department of Education and 
Training (ACT) (2011).  
95 Caldwell and Spinks (1992) Caldwell and Spinks (1998) . 
96 Hargreaves (2010); Hargreaves (2012). 
97 Caldwell and Spinks (2008). 
98 See for example, Caldwell and Spinks (In press). This conclusion is not 
contradicted by the findings of this report that shows the lack of an impact on 
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At a broader level, both within-country and cross-country 
quantitative research suggests that the direct gain produced by 
increasing autonomy is relatively small.  
A large number of studies have examined the impact of varying 
levels of school autonomy within countries. Results in the 
literature differ quite widely, making it hard to generalise from 
them.99  
In England, numerous studies have produced varied findings of 
the impact of increasing school autonomy.100 Small positive 
relationships are evident in some studies. For example, Machin & 
Vermont found in 2012 that schools that had become autonomous 
school academies between 2001 and 2008 increased 
achievement by about 0.2 of a standard deviation.101 In 2009 
Clark found that school communities in England that voted to 
increase their autonomy had a slightly higher increase in student 
performance compared to those communities that narrowly 
decided not to increase their autonomy.102  
                                                                                    
school reform when school autonomy is not supported by other policies such as 
a clear strategic direction to improve learning and teaching, capacity building in 
schools, and high-quality leadership development.  
99 Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission (2013). 
100 Gorard (2009); National Audit Office (UK) (2010); Allen (2012); Academies 
Commission (2013) . 
101 Machin and Vernoit (2012). 
102 Clark (2009). 
Box 8: Victoria’s long path to school autonomy  
Two decades ago the Schools of the Future policy started 
Victoria’s march to high school autonomy.103 Autonomy over 
staffing increased and schools gained control over 93 per cent of 
the state’s education budget to spend on what they needed.104 In 
1998, the Self-governing Schools program gave some schools 
even greater powers. The program was subsequently ended but 
Victoria remains one of the world’s most autonomous systems.105 
Despite this, Victoria’s performance on national and international 
assessments is not significantly different from NSW, where 
autonomy is much lower. Scores in NAPLAN follow similar 
trends.106 In PISA 2009, NSW outperformed Victoria in reading 
literacy and the states scored equally in mathematical literacy.107  
In the ‘Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study’ 
and the ‘Progress in International Reading Literacy Study’, there 
were no significant differences in the latest assessments of 
maths, science, and reading literacy for Year 4 students. Year 8 
students in NSW outperform Victoria in science and maths.108  
  
                                            
103 Dixon (2011); Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission (2012). 
104 Hinz (2010). 
105 Productivity Commission (2012); Dixon (2011). 
106 NAPLAN (2008); NAPLAN (2009); NAPLAN (2010); NAPLAN (2011); 
NAPLAN (2012). 
107 Thomson, et al. (2010), p. 58 and 184. 
108 These results are from the TIMMS and PIRLS studies. See Thomson, et al. 
(2012). 
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In the United States, meta-analyses that review the literature on 
the impact of granting schools extra autonomy have produced 
varied findings.109 Individual studies reflect this variation. For 
example, Hoxby & Murarka compared the performance of 
students who won a lottery to enter a charter school in the United 
States with those who lost the lottery and stayed in a public 
school.110 They found that the students who moved to charter 
schools increased their performance by 0.04-0.09 standard 
deviations. The authors attributed much of the increased student 
performance to a longer school year in charter schools.111 Other 
studies have found no impact on student performance of the 
increased autonomy available to charter schools.112 
Across country evidence 
The level of autonomy in a country’s schools is not consistent with 
how well they perform internationally. Figure 9 shows the weak 
correlation between PISA scores and level of autonomy. Higher 
performing countries lie on the right of the chart and have levels of 
autonomy ranging from high (Hong Kong and Shanghai), to low 
(Finland and Canada) and anywhere in between. Korea and 
Australia have similar levels of autonomy, but Korea considerably 
outperforms Australia in PISA tests. 
Figure 9 shows the relationship between performance and the 
average level of school autonomy across all decision-making 
domains. Analyses that isolate the relationship between specific 
                                            
109 Miron, et al. (2008); Betts and Tang (2011). 
110 Hoxby and Murarka (2009). 
111 Ibid. 
112 Raymond (2009). 
types of school autonomy and PISA performance find that schools 
with autonomy over curriculum and assessment matters tended to 
have higher scores. In contrast, there is no significant relationship 
between performance and autonomy over resource allocation.113 
Figure 9: Performance in PISA 2009 and level of autonomy in the 
system 
  
Note:  the level of autonomy was calculated using an average of the various domains of 
autonomy collected by the OECD.  
Source:  OECD (2010b); OECD (2010d) 
  
                                            
113 Correlation coefficient of school responsibility for curriculum and assessment 
and reading performance: 0.49. Correlation coefficient of school responsibility for 
resource allocation and reading performance: 0.03. (OECD (2010c), p. 44). 
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Other analyses of PISA data have produced some positive 
findings. For example, Hanushek, et al. (2011) find a positive 
relationship between student performance and school autonomy 
over academic content and resource allocation decisions. But the 
OECD (2010) finds a positive impact only for autonomy over 
academic content.  
In their analysis of different school systems around the world, 
Mourshed et al. (2010) show that school autonomy is more 
effective in systems that are moving from ‘great to excellent’. This 
highlights that schools (and school systems) need a number of 
the fundamental drivers of school improvement in place to 
effectively utilise their autonomy.  
4.2.2 Data is often ambiguous 
Measuring school autonomy is difficult and fraught with 
ambiguities.114 Two problems dominate: 
1. ‘Schools’ are not granted autonomy: It is misleading to say 
autonomy is granted to a school: autonomy devolves decision-
making responsibilities to the leaders of a school. When this is 
the principal the line of decision-making is clear. But the 
involvement of other actors, such as a school board or school 
council, makes it harder to decipher who has governance and 
decision-making responsibilities, and to measure what impact 
autonomy is having. For example, does a principal have 
autonomy if the local school council has a large role in 
decision-making? 
                                            
114 Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission (2013), p. 27. 
2. Measurement of autonomy: School autonomy is often not 
absolute. Multiple levels of authority often share decisions. For 
example, a principal may choose a course of action in which 
his or her options are bounded by a national framework. Or a 
school principal may have some say over hiring and firing staff 
but can only make these decisions in concert with a school 
council, and operate under centralised agreements that 
restrict – often severely – who and how many staff the school 
can hire. Under such circumstances, how much autonomy 
does a school principal actually have? 
There is also the question of how much autonomy a school 
can have in a given area. Budgets provide an important 
example. Across the OECD, school autonomy data shows that 
schools make most decisions over their budget.115 What does 
this mean in practice? Most systems have centralised staffing 
agreements that set salaries and often the number of teachers 
to be employed. Salaries regularly comprise 70 to 90 per cent 
of a school budget. Under these arrangements, how much 
autonomy can really exist over school budgeting decisions?  
Caution must be taken in transferring empirical findings into policy 
reforms. Empirical evidence has not been able to identify a linear 
impact from different levels of school autonomy. Does increasing 
autonomy from 20 to 30 per cent of school decisions have the 
same impact as moving from 80 to 90 per cent? It’s not clear. 
There is also little understanding of how the interaction of different 
aspects of autonomy – curriculum and personnel, for example – 
work at the school level. Perhaps there is a tipping point at which 
school leaders feel they have the autonomy to assume control of 
                                            
115 OECD (2010b). 
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their school? Conversely, perhaps increasing autonomy above a 
given level has small or even negative returns if they push against 
capacity constraints of school leaders. 
For these reasons the analysis (presented in Chapter 5) 
compares only the extreme ends of the school autonomy 
spectrum: schools with complete autonomy and schools with 
none.
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5. Education strategy and increasing school autonomy
A number of policy makers in Australia and other countries have 
emphasised school autonomy as a fundamental plank of their 
education strategy. This may be based on the evidence that some 
schools excel with increased autonomy, often using innovative 
policies to lift school performance.116  
A more nuanced understanding can be gained from examining 
how schools operate and respond to increased autonomy. OECD 
data show that there are few differences between high and low 
autonomy schools in how teachers are developed, appraised, and 
receive feedback. These are crucial areas for system 
improvement and areas that school autonomy and competition 
policies often target.117  
5.1.1 The impact of autonomy on how schools operate 
Two key policies to increase school autonomy – and school 
competition for that matter – are to introduce more private schools 
(which have greater autonomy almost by definition) and to 
increase the autonomy of government schools. The impact of 
                                            
116 Hargreaves (2012). 
117 TALIS provides information about teaching practices and beliefs, school 
leadership, teacher appraisal and feedback, and professional development 
across lower-secondary schools in Australia and numerous other OECD and 
non-OECD countries. Ideally, differences in teaching between different types of 
schools would be assessed through classroom observations. This data does not 
exist alongside the breadth of data available in TALIS which measures items that 
the literature suggests would be indicative of high quality teaching and school 
management.  
such policies is analysed, first in Australian schools and then in 
other countries.  
Figure 10 shows the percentage of lower secondary schools in 
Australia with low, medium and high levels of staffing autonomy 
(as reported by each school’s principal). Given the difficulties of 
accurately measuring school autonomy (discussed in Chapter 4) 
this report compares only schools at the extreme ends of the 
autonomy spectrum. 
This report compares: 
• the 19 per cent of teachers who work in low-autonomy 
government schools. School leaders in these schools cannot 
make hiring and firing decisions. 
• the 29 per cent of teachers who work in high-autonomy private 
schools. These have complete autonomy to hire and fire. 
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Figure 10: Percentage of Australian schools with different levels of 
autonomy118  
 
For autonomy to have a large impact on teacher quality, and 
academic performance, we would expect large differences in how 
these two categories of schools operate.  
Table 2 compares teachers’ reports of teacher appraisal, 
feedback and development in these two categories of schools. 
Teacher appraisal, feedback and development are key levers to 
                                            
118 OECD (2009b) provides a representative sample of lower-secondary 
teachers and their school principal. ‘Low autonomy’ is classified as schools 
where all decisions in this domain are made by government, local or national. 
‘Shared responsibilities’ is classified as decisions made locally, by teacher, 
principal or school board, and by government. 
improve learning and teaching in schools and have been shown to 
be strongly influenced by the actions of school leaders.119  
In general, while highly autonomous private schools perform 
slightly better than centralised government schools on teacher 
development, appraisal and feedback, the differences are not 
stark. 
In both school categories, less than ten per cent of teachers 
report that they would receive any recognition (monetary or non-
monetary) for improving the quality of their teaching or being more 
innovative in the classroom. Only around ten per cent of teachers 
in both school categories report that the most effective teachers 
receive the greatest recognition in their school. In both categories, 
a majority of teachers report that teacher evaluation is not linked 
to what actually happens in the classroom (66 per cent in 
centralised government schools compared to 56 per cent in high-
autonomy private schools).  
Increasing autonomy or the number of private schools will not 
change the fact that across all schools, teacher development, 
appraisal and feedback is poor. A vital means to improve learning 
and teaching in schools is being missed.120  
                                            
119 Hattie (2009); Jensen and Reichl (2011). 
120 OECD (2009a). 
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 Table 2: Differences in Australian school staffing autonomy 
(percentage of teachers in each school category) 
School practice  
Low-
autonomy 
government 
schools 
High-
autonomy 
private 
schools 
Teacher evaluation is ‘just an 
administrative exercise’  68% 56% 
Dismiss teachers with sustained 
poor performance  17% 44% 
Staff tolerate sustained poor 
performance  50% 41% 
Alter the pay of a persistently 
under-performing teacher  56% 67% 
Most effective teachers receive 
greatest rewards  8% 10% 
Recognition for improving quality of 
teaching  6% 10% 
Recognition for innovative teaching  6% 10% 
Teacher evaluation not linked to 
classroom teaching  66% 56% 
Development plan for teachers  51% 50% 
Days of teacher professional 
development  8 9 
Note:  Autonomy is measured by the ability to hire and fire staff  
Source:  Grattan analysis of OECD (2009b) 
There are also small differences in the extent to which school staff 
tolerate sustained under-performance. Yet there is a substantial 
difference in the frequency with which highly autonomous private 
schools dismiss poorly performing teachers. Only 17 per cent of 
teachers in centralised government schools reported that teachers 
in their school with sustained poor performance would be 
dismissed. But 44 per cent of teachers in highly-autonomy private 
schools said this would happen. It is a good thing that 
underperformance is being addressed but clearly it is being 
addressed without effective performance management systems.  
These findings should not be overstated. If a lack of autonomy 
was the main impediment to dismissing poorly performing staff 
then more than 44 per cent of teachers would report that it 
happens in their highly autonomous private school. Other 
constraints clearly exist. 
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Box 9: Independent public schools in WA   
Since 2010, 255 schools in Western Australia have become 
Independent Public Schools (IPS). They receive greater 
autonomy over staffing, human and financial resources and 
various administrative and management responsibilities.121  
The program follows an opt-in autonomy model whereby schools 
choose to apply to the program. Schools need to demonstrate 
they have the capacity to effectively use greater autonomy, and 
that this will be of benefit to their local area. The community, 
including staff, need to support the school’s effort to become an 
IPS. Only once they have demonstrated their capacity can 
schools actually join the program. 
There is substantial capacity-building for schools selected for IPS 
status. This includes identification of school improvement 
programs that must be detailed in a three-year business plan. In 
addition, the Government provides training for school principals, 
staff and board members as they move to IPS status. 
As more schools seek IPS status the challenge for policy makers 
will be not only building capacity in all of these schools, but in 
maintaining high standards to achieve IPS status. 
 The program is relatively new. The recent evaluation found that 
“in general, the initiative has had a neutral or positive effect on the 
classroom” and that the foundations were in place for 
improvement in student learning.122  
School principals have found the ability to select staff the most 
important aspect of the program, allowing them to select teachers 
that fit the schools’ students and ethos. The evaluation 
emphasises the importance of change management with the 
introduction of autonomy.123  
For some, the increased responsibility is a daunting increase in 
responsibility, which can be eased with appropriate training, 
support and management. 
 
 
                                            
121 Department of Education (WA) (2012b). 
122Melbourne Graduate School of Education (2013), p. 34. 
123 Ibid., p. 46. 
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5.1.2 The impact of autonomy on how schools operate: 
international findings 
To see whether the pattern of difference between low-autonomy 
government schools and high-autonomy private schools extended 
beyond Australia, a broader sample of countries was analysed. 
Given the relatively small number of private schools in some 
countries, to make the analysis meaningful we only examined 
countries with a high proportion of private schools (in the 2008 
TALIS sample, these countries were Australia; Austria; Belgium; 
Denmark; Ireland; Korea; Portugal and Spain).124  
Figure 11 presents the concentration of low-autonomy 
government schools in these countries, and shows that: 
1. 45 per cent of teachers work in low-autonomy government 
schools. 
2. 27 per cent of teachers work in high-autonomy private 
schools. 
As was the case with the Australian analysis, there were very few 
major differences in the staff management, development and 
appraisal practices of low-autonomy government schools 
compared to their high-autonomy private counterparts (as 
summarised in Table 3). 
Both generally fail to recognise teacher performance, conduct 
effective teacher appraisal, or make important links to teacher 
development. Nine per cent of teachers said effective teachers 
                                            
124 OECD (2009b). 
were rewarded in their centralised government schools compared 
to 10 per cent of teachers in highly autonomous private schools. 
Similar numbers of teachers reported their school recognised 
quality and innovative teaching. 
Figure 11: Percentage of schools in selected TALIS countries with 
different levels of autonomy125 
 
 
                                            
125 Countries analysed: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Korea, 
Portugal and Spain. Ibid. provides a representative sample of lower-secondary 
teachers and their school principal. ‘Low autonomy’ is classified as schools 
where all decisions in this domain are made by government (local or national). 
‘Shared responsibilities’ is classified as decisions made locally, by teacher, 
principal or school board, and by government. 
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Once again, the only major difference between the two categories 
related to dismissing teachers with sustained poor performance. 
This rarely happens in centralised government schools (only ten 
per cent of teachers report it occurring in their schools). Over one-
third of teachers said it happened in their highly-autonomous 
private schools. This is an important difference and highlights the 
role of policy in this area. But for most teachers across any 
category of school, it is troubling that addressing poor 
performance is rare and not linked to effective performance 
management. For too many teachers, teacher evaluation is not 
linked to what happens in the classroom. Teachers are not being 
evaluated on the quality of teaching and learning in either 
centralised government schools or highly autonomous private 
schools.   
 
Table 3: Differences in staffing autonomy in selected TALIS 
countries* (percentage of teachers in each school category) 
School practice  
Low-autonomy 
government 
schools 
High-autonomy 
private schools 
Teacher evaluation is ‘just an 
administrative exercise’  54% 39% 
Dismiss teachers with sustained 
poor performance  10% 36% 
Staff tolerate sustained poor 
performance  39% 35% 
Alter the pay of a persistently 
under-performing teacher  10% 15% 
Most effective teachers receive 
greatest rewards  9% 10% 
Recognition for improving 
quality of teaching  11% 12% 
Recognition for innovative 
teaching  12% 12% 
Teacher evaluation not linked to 
classroom teaching  60% 50% 
Development plan for teachers  44% 57% 
Days of teacher professional 
development  24 17 
Note: *  Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Korea, Portugal and Spain. Note 
also that autonomy is measured by the ability to hire and fire staff  
Source:  OECD (2009b) 
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6. Conclusion
The policy implications of this report are generally divided 
between school competition and school autonomy. However, the 
need for effective education strategy transcends both policy 
areas. 
6.1 School competition to improve performance 
By increasing competition, government policies have increased 
the effectiveness of many sectors of the economy. But school 
education is not one of them. The impact of interventions to 
increase school competition has been marginal, at best. Even in 
Australian education markets with relatively high numbers of 
private schools, with government funding to private schools, and 
with government schools that have relatively high autonomy, most 
schools face no or limited competition based on their 
performance. The structure of school education and the failures in 
the market are too great. This doesn’t mean that school 
competition has a negative impact or does not have other 
benefits. Nor does it mean that some schools don’t face 
competitive pressures or that some students will choose schools 
because they are high performing. It just means it is not a viable 
way of increasing the performance of school systems.  
Government interventions to improve the market won’t solve the 
problem. The My School website was a significant intervention in 
Australian education, increasing transparency and the focus on 
key areas of literacy and numeracy. This great increase in 
information about schools has not led to a level of competition that 
increases peformance. Generally, families don’t use the 
information to choose higher performing schools. When families 
don’t choose schools based on performance, schools do not have 
market-based incentives to improve their performance. Not only 
do high-performing schools not grow sufficiently, people still 
choose to attend low-performing schools.  
Part of the reason is that governments cannot pursue strategies 
that actively seek to push families away from low-performing 
schools and towards high-performing schools. Basic marketing 
tells you that changing human behaviour and purchasing 
decisions requires much more than information. It requires selling 
one alternative over another.126  Governments cannot do this. For 
a variety of political and governance reasons, governments 
cannot encourage families to leave a school because it is low-
performing. 
Nor will vouchers or subsidies to private schools make much 
difference. They won’t overcome the market failures inherent in 
school education. Neither will significant increases in the capacity 
of government schools. Reducing capacity constraints will 
substantially increase expenditure, but have a limited impact on 
competition that increases performance across systems.  
Policy makers can pursue programs to expand the capacity of 
specific high-performing schools but this will only improve some 
                                            
126 Haan and Moraga-Gonzalez (2011) find that persuasive advertising is 
essential to attract consumer interest and sales in a competitive market. Bruce, 
et al. (2012) study consumers’ responses to advertising, finding that advertising 
triggers the cognitive processes that produce sales and build brands. 
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local markets. Encouraging greater collaboration between schools 
with varying levels of performance can also be important but this 
is more a school improvement program than a reform to increase 
school competition.127  
6.2 Poor strategy and implementation of school autonomy 
means school performance is not improving 
There are few differences in key school improvement programs in 
highly autonomous schools compared to centralised schools. 
They too often share the same bad practices. This doesn’t mean 
that school autonomy should not be pursued but it does show that 
it is often poorly implemented, and it has little impact in vital areas 
that should be the focus of reform.  
If too much emphasis is placed on increasing school autonomy, 
strategy becomes unbalanced. This means too little focus is put 
on policies that have consistently been found to improve school 
systems.  
High-performing systems have varying levels of school autonomy, 
but they all have a clearly articulated focus on effective learning 
and teaching, strong capacity building in schools, and 
implementation plans that connect high-level strategy to what 
happens in the classroom.128 This may sound like extensive 
government involvement, but it isn’t. Detailed implementation 
plans do not mean that government intervention will crush school 
autonomy.129 Both Hong Kong and Ontario, for example, had 
                                            
127Jensen and Farmer (2013). 
128 Jensen, et al. (2012), Fullan (2011). 
129 Mourshed, et al. (2010); Caldwell and Spinks (2013). 
improvement strategies that turned their systems into two of the 
best in the world.130 Both focused intensely on implementation. 
Both created positions in schools to lead improvements in 
learning and teaching that connected strategy to the classroom.  
But each system gave schools autonomy in different ways. In 
Ontario, schools were told they had to have someone to lead 
improvements in learning and teaching but the schools could 
choose the person and what position they would hold.131 The 
Hong Kong government, by contrast, was more direct in its 
intervention, creating specific positions in schools to lead reform. 
In other areas, Hong Kong grants large degrees of school 
autonomy but in this area the government was more direct and 
explicit in its intervention.132  
Policy makers have often struggled with ineffective practices that 
place staff hiring and firing decisions in the hands of a central 
body. Increasing school autonomy has often been a response.133 
An effective school strategy recognises that empowering school 
leaders is about much more than autonomy. It lifts capacity in 
schools to effectively appraise, develop and provide meaningful 
feedback to teachers. Too often, schools are being granted 
autonomy with insufficient capacity building and in many cases an 
incomplete reform strategy. This means that autonomous schools 
generally have the same poor practices in these crucial areas as 
those dictated by a centralised body.  
                                            
130 Mourshed, et al. (2010). 
131 Levin (2008). 
132 Jensen, et al. (2012). 
133 OECD (2010c), p. 41. 
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Similar examples are found in how schools spend their money. 
Evidence from England has shown that substantial increases in 
school autonomy and funding have often resulted in inefficient 
expenditure.134 Principals in the ACT with increased budget 
autonomy spent it first on computers and second on new 
classroom furnishings.135 Again, neither of these is known to 
particularly improve teaching and learning. But both are visible 
and help a school trying to attract parents.136 An effective 
strategy, on the other hand, provides both direction and autonomy 
in how schools effectively spend money to increase learning.  
Centralised accountability and autonomy 
Numerous analyses of reform in high-performing education 
systems show that increasing autonomy is most effective if it is 
accompanied by increased accountability. Performance needs to 
be monitored and evaluated so that autonomous schools are held 
accountable for it.137  
                                            
134 Cunningham and Lewis (2012). 
135 Hugh Watson Consulting (2004). 
136 Research shows that parents often value visible aspects of education, as 
discussed in Section 3.1. 
137 Mourshed, et al. (2010); OECD (2010e). It is important to differentiate varying 
types of accountability. Normally, school accountability is discussed in terms of 
accountability to governments or another centralised institution (for example, see 
OECD (2011)). But school competition and autonomy should also increase 
market accountability (i.e. parents using their power to choose schools to shape 
school practices). There is little evidence of the magnitude of market 
accountability, although the low levels of school competition detailed in this 
report would indicate that market accountability is, for most schools, less of an 
influence than accountability mechanisms to government. We can assume that 
all schools are accountable to parents. Intuitively, it may be that schools facing 
Some systems succeed in increasing both school accountability 
and school autonomy, but many don’t. Increasing accountability 
can (but not always will) reduce the benefits of school autonomy 
as predicted in some quantitative studies. School accountability 
and autonomy can be opposing forces. For example, holding 
schools accountable through national student testing reduces 
their autonomy over curriculum, assessment and, to some 
degree, pedagogy. Holding schools accountable for how they 
implement a national curriculum reduces their autonomy over 
what they teach.  
For these reasons, there has been decrease in some aspects of 
school autonomy in Australia and other countries in recent years. 
The policy rhetoric has focused on increasing autonomy, and 
accountability has been increased alongside these moves. In 
Australia, national tests have been introduced and a national 
curriculum is being implemented. The net impact has been a 
reduction in school assessment autonomy: in 2000, 99 per cent of 
students were in schools with local assessment autonomy, 
compared to 65 per cent in schools with local control in 2009.138  
The predicted impact of increasing school autonomy can be 
substantially reduced if an accompanying increase in school 
                                                                                    
competitive pressures from other schools would face greater accountability from 
parents, but there is no data available on this issue.  
138 A similar finding exists in the United States. In 2000, 93 per cent of students 
were in schools with local assessment autonomy. By 2009, this had fallen to 46 
per cent. This occurred during a substantial increase in school accountability and 
a greater emphasis on national testing led by No Child Left Behind. Again, the 
estimated gains that would be achieved by increasing school autonomy are 
virtually all wiped out from consequent increases in school accountability. 
Source: OECD (2004), p. 22 and p. 74; OECD (2010c), Figure IV.3.3b, p71.  
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accountability also reduces autonomy. This is particularly 
pertinent given that the OECD finds that the strongest link 
between school autonomy and performance is for autonomy over 
curriculum and assessment decisions. Yet, it is this aspect of 
school autonomy that can be decreased when national student 
assessments and tighter curriculum standards are introduced 
(often in conjunction with increased school autonomy).  
This doesn’t mean the strategy of increasing school autonomy 
and school accountability at the same time is wrong. But the 
impact of school autonomy predicted by some quantitative studies 
may not eventuate if increases in school accountability decrease 
school autonomy. 
A school should not be given autonomy without monitoring and 
evaluating its performance. So how do systems overcome the 
problem of implementing an accountability regime while still 
increasing important aspects of autonomy?  
First, policy makers need to drop the notion that autonomy is a 
goal in itself. Improving learning should always be the objective. 
Second, the mix of school autonomy and accountability needs to 
be designed within a strategy to improve learning and teaching 
behaviours. Not all accountability measures will substantially 
impact on important aspects of school autonomy. School 
accountability that empowers teachers and school principals can 
increase school autonomy over the longer term. Some forms of 
school inspections can focus on improving specific aspects of 
teaching.139 
                                            
139 Jensen, et al. (2012). 
Education strategy in Hong Kong maps how each policy and 
program, including autonomy and accountability, affect learning 
and teaching in the classroom. Push reforms provide teachers 
and school leaders with new content and support for 
improvement. Pull reforms set new standards and outcomes that 
teachers, school leaders and students must reach.140 
Third, it is necessary to determine which aspects of autonomy are 
most important to increase. They should be aligned to the overall 
improvement strategy and reflect current levels of autonomy. 
They may even decrease as school accountability increases.  
Autonomy and empowerment are often used interchangeably and 
this is a mistake. Autonomy allows school leaders to make 
decisions and take specific actions. It is only one possible element 
of empowering school leaders. Empowering school leaders 
requires a clear strategy that provides direction on important 
elements of school reform. Perhaps most importantly, 
empowering school leaders requires developing their leadership 
skills so they can effectively exercise the autonomy they are 
given.  
The evidence is clear that in Australia and other countries with 
large shares of highly-autonomous private schools, school leaders 
have been given significant autonomy. But they have not been 
empowered to make necessary reforms in teacher appraisal, 
feedback and development that will increase student learning. 
Too much of an emphasis on school autonomy means systems 
have failed to empower school leaders.  
  
                                            
140 Ibid. 
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Appendix A: Methodology, data, and assumptions
This appendix details the data, methodology and assumptions 
used to quantify the extent to which schools face competitive 
pressures. 
In addition to detailing the methods used in this report, this 
appendix explores how robust the findings are to changes in a 
number of assumptions. It also investigates how the analysis is 
affected by changes in policy-relevant variables, for example the 
capacity of public schools, or the fees charged by private schools. 
In general, although the estimates of competition are sensitive to 
the assumptions, the main results are robust. Specifically, 
regardless of assumptions: 
• A significant proportion of schools face little or no competition. 
In fact, in most scenarios presented below, the proportion of 
schools not facing competitive pressures is substantially 
higher than the numbers presented in the report. 
• Government policies can only have a limited impact in 
spurring competition. 
In the interest of concision, the results are not presented under an 
exhaustive combination of possible assumptions. However, 
should policy-makers or researchers be interested in the outcome 
of the modelling under scenarios not presented here, the authors 
will endeavour to supply the information. 
 
A.1 Overview of methodology 
The analysis was structured around two questions: “how much 
competition currently exists?” and “is there scope to raise this 
level substantially through public policy?” 
Grappling with these questions first required a definition of what it 
means for two schools to be in meaningful competition. The 
definition on four dimensions: 
• distance (between two potentially-competing schools) 
• relative school performance (in terms of NAPLAN scores) 
• relative price (in terms of school fees) 
• capacity status 
The definition of ‘competitive pressure’ was the presence of a 
competitor that was: local; at least as good; affordable and not 
at capacity. With this definition of competition, the analysis 
comprised six main steps: 
1. assemble and geocode a list of schools (within a jurisdiction of 
interest) 
2. define a local market for each of these schools, and 
enumerate potential competitors 
3. define a school-commuting function to answer the question, 
‘how likely is it that a student will travel to a competitor 
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school?’ 
4. identify which schools are at capacity 
5. identify schools which are ‘at least as high-performing’ 
6. define an affordability function to answer the question ‘how 
likely is it that a student will be able to afford a competitor 
school?’ 
The remainder of this section outlines the data, methods and 
assumptions used in each of these six steps. 
Box 10: Terms used in defining competition 
‘Local’ was defined according to current commuting patterns. The 
baseline range for a school’s ‘local area’ was 21.7km.141 
‘School performance’ was defined as the average NAPLAN 
national assessments results from 2008-11, for Year 9, across all 
domains.142 In the baseline definition, a nearby school was coded 
as a competitor if its average was equal to, or greater than, the 
score of the school being analysed. 
‘Affordable’ was defined in terms of households’ current 
willingness to pay for private schools (discussed at length below). 
‘At capacity’ was defined for government schools by a 
combination of current utilisation (if at least 95 per cent) or the 
                                            
141 The data sets and analysis sitting behind these decisions are discussed in the 
remainder of section 1. 
142 This analysis was completed before the release of full NAPLAN results for 
2012, and therefore these results do not form part of the analysis. 
presence of an enrolment management plan (usually 
implemented when a school is close to reaching capacity). 
A.1.1 Assemble and geocode a list of schools 
The analysis focused on secondary schools – specifically, entry 
into secondary school. Secondary schools were chosen because 
the transition from primary to secondary school is the point at 
which the most students change schools, making competition 
more likely. 
The focus on secondary schools meant primary schools were 
excluded from the analysis, although ‘combined’ schools (i.e. 
schools offering both primary and secondary education) were not 
filtered out. 
Geographically, the analysis centred on South East Queensland 
(SEQ). There were two reasons for this: 
• It was beyond the Institute's resources to assemble the 
requisite data for all secondary schools in Australia (this was 
especially true of the primary research into private school 
capacity). 
• As discussed below, data from a variety of sources were 
needed to undertake the analysis. In two instances, the 
highest quality accessible data came from Queensland (i.e. 
data on school commuting, and information on public school 
capacity). 
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A list of Queensland’s secondary and combined schools was 
sourced from the My School website (sample size=498).143  
 
Schools were excluded if they: 
• did not report NAPLAN information in any of the years 2008 
to 2011; or 
• were missing total enrolment information in 2009 or 2011. 
This reduced the sample to 451 schools. 
Last, schools that were outside SEQ were put to one side, leaving 
a final sample of 233 schools.144  
The geographical boundaries of ‘SEQ’ were defined according to 
the areas covered in the ‘South East Queensland Travel Survey’ 
(SEQTS) (see Figure 12).145 This included the Sunshine Coast, 
the Greater Brisbane area and the Gold Coast.  
The schools were geocoded using iTouchMap.com,146 and the 
resulting co-ordinates were checked with GPS Visualiser.147 
Where co-ordinates differed, Google Street View was used to 
confirm the location of the school.148 
                                            
143 Australian Curriculum Assessment and Reporting Authority (2013a). 
144 Note that we used this sample of non-SEQ Queensland schools to perform 
some exploratory estimates. 
145 Queensland Department of Transport and Main Roads (2009). 
146 iTouchMap (2013). 
147 GPS Visualizer (2013). 
148 Movable Type Sctipts (2013). 
The characteristics of the schools in the SEQ sample are 
compared to average Australian ‘metropolitan’ schools in Table 
4.149 The SEQ schools are broadly representative of Australian 
metropolitan secondary schools, with the caveat that SEQ schools 
tend to be bigger than the Australian average. 
Table 4: Comparison of secondary schools in SEQ, and Australia 
 SEQ Australia (metro*) 
Number of schools 233 1,366 
Size  
(mean 2011 enrolment) 
999 893 
School ICSEA (mean) 1,028 1,041 
NAPLAN performance  
(mean Year 9 score across all domains, 
2008-11) 
576.4 583.5 
% of Private Schools 45% 52% 
% of ‘Combined’ schools┼ 46% 41% 
Notes: *’Metropolitan is a designation given on the My School website; ┼ Combined 
refers to schools that offer both primary and secondary grades. 
Sources:  Grattan Institute research; size and NAPLAN information came from My School; 
fees information came from a search of school websites. 
 
                                            
149 Based on the My School website’s definition of ‘metropolitan’. 
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Figure 12: Geographic area of the analysis 
 
Source: Queensland Department of Transport and Main Roads (2009); ABS Census 
2011 
A.1.2 Define a local area for each school, and enumerate 
potential competitors 
Relative to many industries, the market for schools is local.150 The 
analysis incorporates this aspect of school competition by using 
data from the 2009 SEQTS. The survey contains very detailed 
information for almost 80,000 trips by residents in SEQ (including 
the SA1151 of origin and destination of each trip). This dataset 
gave us a quite a clear picture of current school commuting 
patterns. The analysis made use of the ‘Trips’ file from SEQTS 
data. These data were filtered to include only trips to secondary 
school (DESTPLACE2 = 504), resulting in a total of 2,275 
commutes. The measure of distance was network distance 
travelled (i.e. NETWORK_DIST). The density function for school 
commutes in SEQ in 2009 is presented in Figure 13. 
Figure 13: Density plot of SEQ school commutes (network 
distance) 
 
Source: Queensland Department of Transport and Main Roads (2009) 
                                            
150 See Woods, et al. (1998) and Bell (2009). 
151 Census statistical area – second smallest geographic boundary. 
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In the baseline analysis, we made the conservative assumption 
that a school's local area would be defined by the 95th percentile 
commuting distance – i.e. by a boundary that extended 21.7km 
around each school.  
To find potential competitors, the software R was used to estimate 
the network distances between all possible school pairs. This 
process involved 3 steps: 
a) estimating the straight-line distance between each school 
(based on their co-ordinates, and using the ‘equirectangular 
approximation’)152 
b) estimating a simple linear regression model, with network 
distance as the dependent variable and straight-line distance 
as the predictor. This model was estimated using the school 
commuting data (sample size=2,275)153  
c) using the regression model to predict the network distances 
between schools based on the straight-line distances 
calculated in part (a) 
Having defined the local boundary for each school (i.e. a network 
distance of 21.7km) and estimated the network distance between 
                                            
152 Movable Type Sctipts (2013). 
153 The SEQTS did not have a straight-line distance variable, so one was 
defined. This was achieved in three parts: first, we isolated the ORIG_SA1_2011 
and DEST_SA1_11 variables in the SEQTS data to define the co-ordinates of 
the trip origin and the trip destination; second, we defined a set of co-ordinates 
for the origin and destination of each trip by assuming that the location of each 
trip was defined by the centre-point of each SA1, as defined by the ABS 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics (2011a). Finally, we calculated the straight-line 
distance using the equirectangular approximation already referenced. 
each pair of schools, a list of potential competitors was generated 
for each school simply by finding schools that were within the 
boundary. 
A.1.3 Define a school-commuting function  
The purpose of this step was to answer the question ‘how likely is 
it that a student will travel to a competitor school?’ Within a 
school's local boundary, not all potential competitors will be 
equally likely to compete for students. All else equal, a competitor 
that is next door will exert more competitive pressure than a 
school that is 21.7 km away. 
To incorporate this idea into the analysis, a school commuting 
function was defined using the distribution presented in Figure 13 
(on the previous page). Based on this distribution of revealed 
school commuting distances, the travel-likelihood function as 
plotted is presented in Figure 14.  
Note that Figure 14 reflects current practice. For example, the 
estimate is that 24 per cent of households would be willing to 
commute ten kilometres, based on the fact that currently 24 per 
cent of people commute at least this far. 
It's also worth noting that these figures are independent of school 
quality, access to different transport modes (e.g. public transport, 
car) and a variety of other factors which may determine 
willingness to travel. Incorporating these elements are areas for 
future research. 
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Figure 14: Likelihood that current school commuters travel at least 
a particular distance 
 
Note: This function is essentially (1 minus the CDF of Figure 13) 
Source: Queensland Department of Transport and Main Roads (2009) 
 
A.1.4 Identify which schools are ‘at capacity’ 
For public schools, capacity information was made available by 
the Queensland Department of Education.154  
Implicit to the idea of ‘competition’ is the notion that students are 
able to enrol in the school of their choice. Therefore, public 
schools were defined as facing capacity constraints if either: 
• they had an enrolment management plan (as at October 31 
2012); OR 
                                            
154 To download the data, see Department of Education Training and 
Employment (Qld) (2012). 
• their reported enrolment in the February 2012 census was ≥ 
95 per cent of their assessed capacity. [ 
For private schools, the authors undertook primary research to 
determine capacity constraints. Two methods were used: 
• a short phone interview 
• a very brief email survey sent to enrolment personnel.155 The 
questions asked are presented in Figure 15. 
Figure 15: Questions used to determine ‘capacity’ for private 
schools 
 
Based on responses to these questions, private schools were 
coded as ‘at capacity’ if either: a) they were already full for next 
year (in terms of enrolment into the first year of secondary 
school), or b) if they ended up turning away students last year (for 
entry into secondary school this year).156 
58 per cent of the 128 private schools in the sample responded to 
the information request. Of these, 61 per cent were coded as ‘at 
capacity’. 
                                            
155 The email was sent to schools that we were either unable to reach on the 
phone, or who were more comfortable replying in writing. 
156 Many of the schools we spoke to hadn’t yet finalised their enrolment 
processes for 2014, which is why the second question was included. 
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As illustrated in Table 5, the schools that did not respond to the 
research request were very similar – in terms of size, NAPLAN 
performance and fees – to those that did. 
Table 5: Comparison of schools that did and did not respond to the 
research request. 
 Respondents Non-respondents 
Number of schools 74 54 
Size  
(2011 enrolment) 
921 917 
NAPLAN performance  
(average Year 9 score across all 
domains, 2008-11) 
589.3 593.5 
Fees  
(Year 8, 2013) 
$7,074 $7,060 
Sources:  Grattan Institute research; size and NAPLAN information came from My School; 
fees information came from a search of school websites. 
Imputing capacity for non-respondents. 
The 54 private schools that did not respond to the survey, were 
imputed ‘at capacity’ status, based on a simple probit model, 
where capacity was predicted by the variables listed below (the 
names used in the regression output appear in italics): 
• Year 9 average NAPLAN performance (across all domains 
from 2008-11; this variable was divided by ten to make a 1 
unit shift better reflect a meaningful difference between 
schools), yr9.raw 
• Size (based on total enrolment from 2011; this was divided by 
100), enrolment 
• Change in enrolment (from 2009-11; divided by 100), 
enrol.change 
• Fees (Year 8 fees in 2013, measured in thousands of dollars), 
fees 
• The number of competitors in the local area, competitors 
• The Year 9 NAPLAN score of a school compared to the mean 
score of its local competitors (also divided by ten, to match the 
yr9.raw score), yr9.cf.comp 
• A dummy of whether a school was ‘secondary’ or ‘combined’ 
[i.e. with a primary school], secondary 
• A dummy indicating whether the school was a private school, 
private 
The output of the model is presented in Table 6. 
When applied to the sample of SEQ private schools for which 
there was capacity information, the model correctly predicted the 
known capacity status in 71 per cent of cases. 
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Table 6: Output of probit model used for imputation157 
 Coefficient s.e. 
Intercept -13.47 3.82 
yr9.raw 0.18 0.07 
enrolment  0.19 0.03 
enrol.change 0.36 0.12 
fees -0.06 0.04 
competitors 0.00 0.00 
yr9.cf.comp 0.00 0.05 
secondary 0.78 0.27 
private 1.12 0.32 
 
A.1.5 Identify schools which are ‘at least as high-
performing’ 
Given the focus on secondary schools, school performance was 
defined as the average NAPLAN score for Year 9 (across all 
domains, for 2008-2011). That is, for schools that had reported 
Year 9 NAPLAN scores in each round of testing, the measure of 
performance was taken to be the average of the 20 scores (four 
years, five domains). This data was sourced from the My School 
website.158 
                                            
157 A logit model was also estimated. In terms of predicting the capacity status of 
schools for which was lacking this information, the models produced exactly the 
same result. 
158 Australian Curriculum Assessment and Reporting Authority (2013a). 
It is difficult to know how parents evaluate schools using 
performance data. For instance, some people may be interested 
in raw scores, while others may prioritise high performance in 
‘similar school’ measures (i.e. measures that compare results to 
other schools with similar average socio-economic profiles).  
Based largely on evidence from the UK, it is assumed that parents 
and students would focus more on absolute achievement (as 
opposed to similar school scores).159 
A school was defined as ‘at least as high-performing’ as another 
school if its average Year 9 raw achievement score was greater 
than or equal to the other school. 
A.1.6 Define an affordability function 
There were two analytical components to answering the question 
“how likely is it that a student will be able to afford a competitor 
school?” The first was to build an income profile for each SA1 in 
SEQ. The second was to estimate households willingness-to-pay 
for private schools, based on their income. 
Building an income profile by SA1 
Income data was collected at the SA1 level from ABS 2011 
Census via TableBuilder. 
The data were filtered by Family Composition (i.e. FMFC) at the 
2-digit level.160 Families were excluded unless they were either a 
                                            
159 See Coldron, et al. (2008). Also of note: using raw achievement as opposed 
to a measure of value add appears to be a good strategy for parents interested 
in maximising their child’s test scores, as illustrated in Allen and Burgess (2011). 
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‘couple family with children under 15’ or ‘one parent family with 
children under 15’. 
The income measure used was Total Family Income (Weekly) 
(i.e. FINF).161 All 17 ABS FINF income bands were included. 
‘Negative income’ was coded as having a value of 0 (in total, this 
band represented 0.6 per cent of the non-excluded families). 
Assessing the willingness to pay for private schools, by income 
group 
Wave Ten of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in 
Australia (HILDA) was used to estimate the relationship between 
household income and the level of spending on education. 
The income variable used was jhifefp (household financial year 
gross income).162 
No measure of ‘private school fees’ was available in the data. As 
an indicator, we used jhxyeduc (household annual expenditure - 
education fees).163 Four steps were taken to ensure that this 
variable best captured private school expenditure for secondary 
school students: 
                                                                                    
160 Australian Bureau of Statistics (2011b). 
161 Australian Bureau of Statistics (2011c) 
162 Melbourne Institute (2011). This variable was partly chosen based on a 
comparison of its density plot compared to the ABS measure FINF: i.e. this 
appeared to be the best analogue of the ABS variable. 
163 Ibid. 
• The combined HILDA sample (initial sample size of 17,855) 
was trimmed to exclude cases where household annual 
expenditure on education fees was < 0). This left 15,037 
individuals in the sample. 
• Data was confined to households with individuals between 
the ages of 12 and 17 (inclusive), which left 649 individuals 
remaining in the sample.  
• The sample was filtered to exclude all individuals that 
attended government schools. This left 220 cases. 
• Finally, the data were cleaned so that families with multiple 
children attending private school were only counted once. 
(The number of families with multiple children between 12-
17 attending private school was 12, bringing the final total to 
208).164 
This sample was then stratified into five income buckets. This was 
done to reflect the fact that within each income group, there will 
be a distribution of the willlingness to pay for private school fees.  
For every observed level of private school fees, the authors 
calculated the proportion of people in each income bucket who 
currently paid at least that figure in fees (based on the jhxyeduc 
variable). Figure 16 presents the plots for all five groups. It’s worth 
noting that in each group there are households who pay $0 fees 
                                            
164 This means that in 12 cases, our affordability figures represent the cost of >1 
student in a household. Given our fee data applies to a single student, the effect 
of this is to increase the estimated level of competition relative (by lowering the 
affordability barriers). That said, given the relatively small number of cases, this 
effect has no meaningful impact on our results. 
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(or very low fees). It is speculated that these students are on 
scholarships. 
Combining income data in the sample area, and willingness to 
pay estimates 
The income data, which originally had 17 bands, were rolled into 
the five income buckets defined in the ‘willingness to pay’ charts 
presented in Figure 16. 
The proportion of people in each SA1 who would be able to pay 
was defined by the proportion of people in each income band 
multiplied by the proportion of people in that band who currently 
pay at least that much on private schooling. 
Table 7 presents the example inputs for SA1 311303, and a 
school with Year 8 fees of $10,000. To estimate the likelihood that 
a family in this SA1 will be able to afford these fees, the sum-
product of the two columns was calculated (which in this case 
yielded 29 per cent). 
It’s important to note that this approach leads to a very generous 
estimate of ‘affordability’. Recall that the proportions defined by 
the charts in Figure 16 are based on the population of households 
who currently send their children to private schools. This is clearly 
not a representative sample of Australian households. This 
approach is adopted to be as generous as possible when 
assessing the current levels of competition between schools in 
Queensland. 
Figure 16: Plot of actual fees paid (by household income group) 
 
*Note: For this group, the x-axis is changed, as the sample included a number of 
families in the income group ‘$260,000+’ that paid more than $25,000 in 
education fees in 2010 
Source:  Melbourne Institute (2011) 
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Fee data 
Data on the fees being charged for Year 8 in 2013 came from 
three sources. In order of preference, these were: 
- school websites, quoting 2013 rates (88 per cent of 
schools). [Note that tuition charges were only recorded (i.e. 
not including extra charges such as capital levies, 
application fees and so on). This, again, is a conservative 
approach in terms of access to private schools. In some 
cases, compulsory non-tuition charges make up nearly half 
of the total fees.] 
- school websites, quoting 2012 or 2011 rates and converted 
into 2013 terms using the rough approach of applying the 
average annual increase in the education component of 
capital-city CPI increases from 2009-10 to 2011-12 (4 per 
cent of schools)165 
- the My School website, based on ‘fees/student’ in 2011, put 
in 2013 terms (8 per cent of schools)166  
                                            
165Australian Bureau of Statistics (2012). 
166 Using the inflator available from ibid. 
Table 7: Example inputs for estimating the likelihood that a 
household in SA1 3100135 could afford fees of $10,000 p.a. 
Income bucket Likelihood of people in income 
band to afford $10,000p.a. in 
school fees (defined by 
distributions in Figure 16) 
Proportion of 
SA1 3100135 
in income 
bucket 
0 - $64,999 11% 31% 
$65,000 - $103,999 31% 23% 
$104,000 - $155,999 41% 38% 
$160,000-$259,999 38% 8% 
$260,000+ 80% 0% 
Note:  the slightly lower percentage of income group $160,000-$259,999 (relative to the 
$65,000-$103,999 group reflects the fact that in the HILDA wave 10, the 
observed level of private school costs for these groups was extremely similar) 
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A.2 Worked example 
To illustrate the analytical method used, and how this translated 
into the final outputs, this section presents a worked example of 
the steps described above. The example uses a school chosen at 
random (School X) and used baseline assumptions (see Box 10). 
The data used are summarised in Table 8. The main outputs are:  
1. that School X is not a school that is insulated from 
competition (i.e. it has local competitors that are least as 
good, and not at capacity), and  
2. that School X’s nearest competitor is sufficiently close and 
affordable that a ‘significant’ proportion of its catchment may 
consider this option. The rest of this section describes how the 
conclusions were reached for School X. 
 
 
Table 8: Overview of inputs used in School X example167  
Name Yr9  Naplan Sector 
Dist from 
School X (km) 
Prob  
of  
travel 
Capacity 
(raw 
data) 
Capacity 
(including 
imputation) 
‘At least 
as 
good’? 
Spare 
capacity 
& at least 
as good? 
Yr 8  
Fees 
Prob 
School 
X’s 
students 
can pay 
fees 
School X 578 Private - - - - - - $1,948 100% 
           
Competitor 1 623 Private 3 78% Capacity Capacity Yes No $9,148 46% 
Competitor 2 570 Gov 3 69% Capacity Capacity No No $0 100% 
Competitor 3 619 Private 5 52% Capacity Capacity Yes No $9,036 46% 
Competitor 4 571 Gov 6 48% Spare Spare No No $0 100% 
Competitor 5 578 Gov 7 37% Capacity Capacity Yes No $0 100% 
Competitor 6 646 Private 8 35% Capacity Capacity Yes No $13,512 27% 
                                            
167 An equivalent table was generated for each school in the sample. 
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Competitor 7 592 Gov 8 30% Capacity Capacity Yes No $0 100% 
Competitor 8 596 Private 9 26% No data Spare Yes Yes $8,190 46% 
Competitor 9 552 Gov 9 26% Spare Spare No No $0 100% 
Competitor 10 595 Private 10 24% No data Capacity Yes No $7,180 55% 
Competitor 11 565 Gov 10 23% Capacity Capacity No No $0 100% 
Competitor 12 543 Gov 10 23% Spare Spare No No $0 100% 
Competitor 13 587 Private 11 22% Capacity Capacity Yes No $3,573 83% 
Competitor 14 589 Private 11 21% Spare Spare Yes Yes $5,052 67% 
Competitor 15 595 Private 11 21% Capacity Capacity Yes No $18,232 19% 
Competitor 16 582 Private 12 18% Capacity Capacity Yes No $2,244 94% 
Competitor 17 622 Private 12 17% No data Capacity Yes No $15,965 22% 
Competitor 18 558 Gov 13 16% Spare Spare No No $0 100% 
Competitor 19 592 Private 14 13% Spare Spare Yes Yes $6,140 59% 
Competitor 20 559 Gov 16 11% Capacity Capacity No No $0 100% 
Competitor 21 561 Gov 16 10% Spare Spare No No $0 100% 
Competitor 22 624 Private 17 9% Spare Spare Yes Yes $9,435 46% 
Competitor 23 568 Gov 18 8% Capacity Capacity No No $0 100% 
Competitor 24 572 Gov 19 7% Capacity Capacity No No $0 100% 
Competitor 25 551 Gov 21 6% Spare Spare No No $0 100% 
Define a local area for School X and enumerate potential 
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competitors 
The local market for School X was defined by the 95th percentile 
of commuting distances (21.7km).168 
All 25 secondary schools that were located within this ‘School X’s 
market’ were listed in Table 8.  
Apply the school-commuting function to answer the question, ‘how 
likely is it that a student will travel to a competitor school?’ 
For each of these 25 schools, the likelihood that people would be 
willing to travel from School X to the competing school was 
calculated. This step was included to reflect the fact that, for 
example, Competitor 24 (which is estimated to be a 19km journey 
from School X) is less likely to present a competitive threat than 
Competitor 1 (an estimated 3km trip from School X). 
The likelihood of commuting a particular distance was based on 
2009 school commuting patterns in SEQ.169 The calculated 
likelihood that a family will commute the 19km from School X to 
Competitor 24 (estimated at 7 per cent) is based on the SEQTS 
data, which suggests that only 7 per cent of current school 
commuters travel at least 19km. 
By using the distance between School X and Competitor 24 to 
define the likelihood that School X students will travel to the 
competitor school, it is implicitly assumed that current School X 
students are evenly dispersed around the School X campus, i.e. 
that on average the extra distance students will have to travel to 
                                            
168 See Figure 13 for the whole distribution. 
169 Queensland Department of Transport and Main Roads (2009). 
get to Competitor 24 will be the distance between the two schools. 
This is a limitation of the analysis, as it would be preferable to 
estimate the marginal increase in distance (in switching, say, from 
School X to Competitor 24) from the perspective of SA1s or, 
better still, households.  
Identify which schools are at capacity 
Capacity data for each of School X’s 25 potential competitors 
were assembled from the Queensland Government data170 and 
from the primary research.171 After exhausting these sources, 
three schools still lacked capacity information.  
Identify schools which are ‘at least as high-performing’ 
The baseline assumption is that a school is ‘at least as high-
performing’ as a counterpart if its average Year 9 NAPLAN score 
(the mean taken across all domains and years of data) is greater 
than or equal to the other schools. In the case of School X, this 
required that schools had an average NAPLAN score from 2008-
11 of greater than 578. This was the case for 14 schools. 
                                            
170 Department of Education Training and Employment (Qld) (2012). 
171See description on page 43. 
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Use the affordability function to answer the question ‘how likely is 
it that a household considering School X will be able to afford 
various competitor schools?’ 
This piece of analysis first required us to build an income profile of 
students in School X’s catchment area. In an effort to model the 
typical School X household, this area was defined by SA1s within 
the median travel distance (5.4km) of the school.172 The overall 
income distribution of SA1s in this area was calculated, and then 
performed calculations similar to those in Table 7 (at each of the 
fee levels being charged by the 12 private schools in the sample 
of 25 competitors). It was estimated, for example, that a typical 
household in School X’s catchment area would have a 19 per cent 
likelihood of being willing to pay the $18,232 p.a. to attend 
Competitor 15. 
Finally, these figures were divided by the likelihood that a 
household in School X’s catchment area could afford School X’s 
fees. That is, the estimate of the probability that a current School 
X student could afford a competitor school.  
This adjustment is made to reflect the fact that households with 
children at School X are not a random sample of households in 
the School X’s catchment area. Moreover, for competition to be 
effective, the relevant sample is not simply the people who live 
around School X, but rather School X’s current (and prospective) 
student body.  
 
                                            
172 We chose this distance, rather than the 95th percentile as the broader area – 
extending 21.7km – would be less indicative of the average School X student. 
Final analysis for School X 
The analysis was summarised in terms of the overall competitive 
picture for School X (Table 9), and in terms of the nearest open, 
clearly better competitor (Table 10). 
Table 9: Summary analysis for School X 
Total number of competitors 25 
Number that are ‘at least as high-performing’  14 
Number that are ‘at least as high-performing’, and have 
spare capacity 
4 
 
Table 10: Information on School X’s nearest competitor 
Nearest open at-least-as-good competitor Competitor 8 
Distance from School X to Competitor 8 9km 
Probability of travelling 26% 
Fees at Competitor 8 $8,190 
Probability that School X current households 
will be able to afford $8,190 p.a. 
49% 
 
Finally, the strength of competition faced by School X was defined 
by: 
• The probability households would commute the distance 
between School X and its nearest open, at-least-as-good 
competitor (Competitor 8): 26 per cent 
• The probability that households in School X catchment area 
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would be able to pay the (higher) Competitor 8 fees: 49 per 
cent  
The product of these two numbers is 12 per cent, which is above 
the baseline threshold of ten per cent (below which it is assumed 
that competitive forces will be weak). 
A.3 Sensitivity analysis 
This section has three parts. How robust the core results are is 
investigated by changing in three assumptions: 
1. definition of competition. In the baseline analysis, schools’ 
competitors had to be ‘at least as high-performing’ in terms of 
average Year 9 NAPLAN score. In this section, the 
competitive landscape changes if it is assumed that only 
‘clearly better’ competitors can threaten a school’s 
enrolments. 
2. definition of the local area. In the baseline analysis, 
competitors were defined by a boundary extending a distance 
21.7km from a school (i.e. the 95th percentile of observed 
school commuting distances).  
3. definition of ‘very limited’ competitive pressure. The 
baseline analysis makes the assumption that schools face 
very limited competitive pressure if less than ten per cent of 
households in a school’s core catchment area have a viable 
alternative (where ‘viable’ is defined by the product of the 
likelihood that people will travel to the nearest competitor 
school and the likelihood that they will be able to afford the 
fees at that school). 
A.3.1 Changing the definition of competition, to only 
include ‘clearly better’ schools 
It’s plausible that schools only feel a strong competitive threat 
from schools that are clearly outperforming them. In other words, 
their enrolment levels will not be jeopardised by a school that is 
achieving similar reported outcomes.  
As such, an alternative definition of a school facing competition is 
that a competitor school must be ‘clearly higher performing’. 
It's difficult to know how big the gap in average performance 
between two schools needs to be for parents and students to 
perceive one school as ‘clearly higher performing’. Moreover, 
users of performance information may well differ in the variables 
they focus on.  
Notwithstanding these challenges, the approach remained 
consistent and limited the attention to raw NAPLAN performance. 
The assumption is then that the magnitude of difference in 
NAPLAN results required for parents and students to perceive it 
as performing at a ‘clearly higher’ level, corresponded with the 
performance gap associated with ‘coloured bar’ designations on 
the My School website. 
Consequently, two gaps associated with being ‘clearly higher 
performing’ were defined: 
- 14.6 points. This represents the smallest gap required for 
the My School website to indicate that one school is 
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performing ‘above’ a particular benchmark (whether that be 
a national average, or a comparator school). A gap of 19 
points at the Year 9 level, for example, means the school 
will receive a pale green bar, indicating superior 
performance.173  
- 36.6 points. This represents the smallest gap required for 
the My School website to indicate that one school is 
performing ‘substantially above’ a benchmark.174 
Table 11 illustrates how the main results change under these 
alternative assumptions (as a comparison the baseline 
assumption that a nearby school could be classified as a 
competitor if its NAPLAN performance was ≥ the school being 
analysed is included). 
Clearly, this variable has an impact on the results. In the report, 
the most conservative assumption is used: that a comparator 
school can be classified as a competitor provided its NAPLAN 
score is at least as high as School X. If it is assumed that only 
‘better’ comparator schools jeopardise the enrolments of any 
particular school (where ‘better’ is defined by the smaller NAPLAN 
difference of a 14.6 point gap), then the percentage of schools 
that have zero competition increases from 22 per cent to 41 per 
                                            
173 A school receives an ‘above’ [pale green] rating, if it is greater than 0.2 s.d. 
above a benchmark or comparator school (Australian Curriculum Assessment 
and Reporting Authority (2013b)). 
Our 14.6 number uses this definition in combination with the distribution of 
results in NAPLAN’s 2011 Year 9 testing (NAPLAN (2011); by way of example, 
see p.194 for reading). 
174 ‘Substantially above’ is defined as greater than 0.5 s.d. above a benchmark. 
See above footnote for sources. 
cent. The total number of schools that face limited or no 
competition increases from 43 per cent to 61 per cent. 
Under the stricter assumption that people will be drawn to non-
local schools only by substantially better performance (here 
defined as a 36.6 point gap), then over 80 per cent of schools in 
the sample faced no significant competition. 
A.3.2 Changing the definition of ‘local areas’ 
The extent to which school markets are ‘local’ will depend on 
individual household circumstances, and may vary according to a 
number of factors, including: 
• access to car/public transport 
• the perceived quality of a school compared to local 
offerings. This could be based on academic performance, 
religious teaching, etc. 
• the location of a parent’s work 
• where school-age siblings are enrolled 
• income 
Of these, only income was considered in the analysis although it 
was ultimately discarded as a predictor of commuting distance, 
based on the small and weak relationship it had with school 
commuting distances (NETWORK_DIST) in the SEQTS. 
The definition of a local area has an impact on the overall 
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competitive landscape, as illustrated in Table 12. As expected, if 
the definition of a school’s local area contracts, the level of 
competition it faces tends to decrease. For example, if each 
school’s local area extends out 5.6km (rather than the 21.7km in 
the baseline analysis) then 74 per cent of schools in the sample 
are assessed as not having a viable competitor. That is, with this 
stricter definition of ‘local’, almost three quarters of schools in the 
sample don’t have a local competitor that is at least as high-
performing, and free of capacity constraints. 
The dual impact of the ‘local area’ and ‘clearly better’ assumptions 
are presented in Table 13. Taken together, Tables 11-13 illustrate 
that while competition is generally limited, its absence becomes 
more striking when the restriction is imposed that people don’t 
travel more than 5.4 km. This may have significant implications for 
people who don’t have a car or access to public transport. The 
tables also underscore that if attracting students away from their 
local school requires that competitors have to be better than local 
rivals, then currently, competitive forces are absent for very large 
numbers of schools. 
A.3.3 Changing the definition of ‘very limited competition’ 
The analysis identifies both schools that do not have competitors 
in their local area, and those whose competitors are still local, but 
are either relatively far away, or significantly more expensive. 
If it is estimated that a school’s closest competitor would be a 
viable proposition for fewer than ten per cent of their current 
student base, then this school is labelled as facing ‘very limited 
competition’. 
The effect of changing this ten per cent threshold is illustrated in 
Table 14. As expected, the definition of ‘clearly better’ has an 
impact on the percentage of schools classified as facing limited 
competition. It is for readers to form a judgment of what threshold 
is most appropriate, but note that the calculated proportion of 
students who are subject to competition is simply those who 
feasibly have a better (or similar) option. It does not represent the 
proportion of current or potential students that would/will switch. 
Therefore, the ten per cent figure is a conservative threshold, 
below which it can reasonably be said that limited competitive 
pressures exist.  
A.3.4 Large increase in government school capacity 
One of the strongest responses open to governments to spur 
competition would be to increase the capacity of state schools. 
The effect of removing government-school capacity constraints is 
modelled in Table 15. This is obviously a very strong assumption, 
and would be very costly. Despite the magnitude of the change, 
however, Table 15 shows that a significant proportion of schools 
continue to face limited or no competition. In one plausible 
scenario, for example, this change results in the overall 
percentage of schools who face no or limited competition 
declining from 63% to 49%.175  
There are a variety of reasons why this major change doesn’t 
have more of an impact. First and foremost, school markets are 
local. Although people’s preferences for school commuting may 
                                            
175 This is with local areas set at 11.4km, and with students only attracted to 
competitor schools with NAPLAN scores at least 14.6 points higher. 
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change if very high quality but distant public schools opened their 
doors, it would still likely be the case that many people would not 
be able or inclined to access them. Second a majority of the high-
performing schools that might offer competition are private (and 
so remain unaffected by the change). Last, high performing 
government schools are often in areas where there is already 
more competition (which means that increasing capacity will, at 
the margin, result in a less impressive increase in the number of 
schools facing competition). This illustrates the fact that, while 
capacity constraints in government schools are problematic, 
addressing this issue will not fuel system-wide competition. 
A 3.5  Substantially reducing private school fees 
Another possible avenue to increase competition would be to 
advance policies to reduce private school fees. The effect of 
reducing fees is illustrated in Table 16. Once again, it’s notable 
that even a dramatic shift – in this case a 50% reduction in the 
fees of private schools – does surprisingly little to increase the 
number of schools facing competition. This underscores the 
primary point that to make a substantial difference to the 
competitive landscape would require a fundamental shift in not 
just one, but a number of areas: government and private school 
capacity; willingness to travel; and private school fees. 
A 3.6  Comparing SEQ to the rest of Queensland: some 
preliminary estimates 
As SEQ is Queensland’s highest density area, we would expect 
this area to have the fiercest competition, and that in in other 
areas of the state – especially more rural settings – competition 
between schools would, on average, be less intense. 
To understand the magnitude of the differences, an analysis was 
run for the “rest of Queensland”. All the data described in part 1 of 
this document were available, with the exception of school 
commuting information (for which we were not able to an SEQTS 
substitute). 
In response to the lack of commuting data, the very rough 
assumption was made that people outside of SEQ will be willing 
to travel twice as far as those in the study area. That is, the 
willingness-to-travel function will be double that presented in 
Figure 5 (on page 11). For many of the people living outside the 
SEQ study area, this assumption will be excessive (especially for 
those living in urban areas like Cairns) but without better 
information we err on the side of caution.  
The results of the analysis (under 2 scenarios) are presented in 
Table 17. This is far from exhaustive, however it illustrates an 
important point: the issues and structural barriers to competition in 
SEQ will likely be magnified in less-densely populated areas. 
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Table 11: Sensitivity to different definitions of ‘clearly better’  
 Ave. # 
Schools that 
could be 
competitors 
Ave. # of 
those that 
are ‘clearly 
better’ 
Ave. # that are 
better  
AND OPEN 
Ave. distance to 
closest competitor 
(where one exists) 
Ave. prob 
that closest 
competitor is 
private 
Ave. fee of 
closest 
private 
competitor 
% of schools 
with no 
competitive 
threats 
% of schools with 
very low 
competitive 
pressure 
‘Clearly better’ =  
0 NAPLAN points 
[baseline] 
42 20 5 8.5km 75% $7,741 22% 21% 
‘Clearly better’ = 
14.6 NAPLAN 
points 
42 15 3 8.7km 71% $7,590 40% 20% 
‘Clearly better’ = 
36.6 NAPLAN 
points 
42 8 1.5 10.1km 64% $6,877 63% 18% 
Note: Other assumptions are at baseline levels; local boundary defined by 95th percentile school commute; ‘very limited competitive pressure’ is defined as 10% of the catchment area being 
likely to travel to and pay for a competitor. 
 
Table 12: Sensitivity to different definitions of ‘local area’  
 Ave. # 
Schools that 
could be 
competitors 
Ave. # of 
those that 
are ‘clearly 
better’ 
Ave. # that are 
better  
AND OPEN 
Ave. distance to 
closest competitor 
(where one exists) 
Ave. prob 
that closest 
competitor is 
private 
Ave. fee of 
closest 
private 
competitor 
% of schools 
with no 
competitive 
threats 
% of schools with 
very low 
competitive 
pressure 
35.2km  
(99th percentile) 
79 37 10 10.2km 82% $7,834 12% 30% 
21.7km  
(95th percentile) 
[baseline] 
42 20 5 8.5km 75% $7,741 22% 21% 
11.4km  
(80th percentile) 
15 7 2 6.1km 65% $6,565 41% 7% 
5.4km  
(50th percentile) 
3 1 0 3.8km 56% $7,256 74% 1% 
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Table 13: Percentage of schools that face limited or no competition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Other assumptions are at baseline levels; ‘very limited competition’ threshold is at ten per cent. 
 
Table 14: Sensitivity to different definitions of ‘very limited competition’ 
 
Note: Other assumptions are at baseline levels; local boundary defined by 95th percentile school commute; all schools with average NAPLAN ≥ the school under analysis are considered as 
competitors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Local area 
 Clearly better 
35.2km  
(99th percentile) 
21.7km  
(95th percentile) 
11.4km  
(80th percentile) 
5.4km  
(50th percentile) 
0 NAPLAN points 42% 43% 49% 76% 
14.6 NAPLAN points 60% 60% 63% 82% 
36.6 NAPLAN points  81% 81% 82% 91% 
‘Very limited 
competition’ threshold 
% of schools with very low 
competitive pressure 
5% 7% 
10% 21% 
20% 41% 
The myth of markets in school education 
Grattan Institute 2013  60 
 
Table 15: Scenario: reducing capacity constraints 
Percentage of schools facing no or very limited competition 
 
 Current capacity 
constraints 
Remove all government-
school capacity 
constraints 
Local area = 
21.7km 
“Clearly better” = 0 43% 30% 
“Clearly better” = 14.6 61% 43% 
“Clearly better” = 36.6 81% 70% 
Local area = 
11.4km 
“Clearly better” = 0 49% 34% 
“Clearly better” = 14.6 63% 49% 
“Clearly better” = 36.6 82% 75% 
Note: “Very limited competition” is set at 10% 
 
Table 16: Scenario: reducing private school fees 
Percentage of schools facing no or very limited competition 
  Current prices 50% reduction 
Local area = 
21.7km 
“Clearly better” = 0 43% 33% 
“Clearly better” = 14.6 60% 51% 
“Clearly better” = 36.6 81% 76% 
Local area = 
11.4km 
“Clearly better” = 0 49% 41% 
“Clearly better” = 14.6 63% 56% 
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“Clearly better” = 36.6 82% 77% 
Note: “Very limited competition” is set at 10% 
 
Table 17: Comparison of SEQ and “rest of Queensland” 
 
Ave. # Schools 
who could be 
competitors 
 Ave. # of 
those who 
are “clearly 
better” 
 Ave. # who 
are better  
AND OPEN 
 Ave. distance to 
closest competitor 
(where one exists) 
Ave. prob that 
closest 
competitor is 
private  
 Ave. fee of 
closest 
private 
competitor 
% of schools 
with no 
competitive 
threats 
% of schools with 
very low 
competitive 
pressure 
SEQ  
(n=234) 
Clearly 
better = 0 42 20 5 8.5km 75% $7,765 22% 21% 
Clearly 
better = 
14.6 
42 15 3 8.7km 71% $7,610 41% 20% 
Rest of 
Queensland 
(n=217) 
Clearly 
better = 
0 
6 3 2 12.7km 52% $4,823 42% 11% 
Clearly 
better = 
14.6 
6 2 1 13.9 km 53% $4,971 53% 11% 
Notes: Assumptions for SEQ local are set at 21.7km for SEQ; “very limited competition” set at 10%. 
Assumptions for “Rest of Queensland ,local area set at 43.4km; note that in the absence of quality commuting data, we make the assumption that households out of South East 
Queensland are willing to travel twice as far as those within the study area; “very limited competition” set at 10%.  
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